SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- Dismissal of application for quashing of criminal proceedings by High Court - Inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on Court to act according to its whims and fancies.

 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka, JJ.

Criminal Appeal Nos.200 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.8283 of 2021). D/d. 10.2.2022.

Shafiya Khan @ Shakuntala Prajapati - Appellants

Versus

State of U.P. & Anr. - Respondents

For the Appellants :- Mr. Gaurav, Advocate.

For the Respondents :- Mr. Adarsh Upadhyay, Mr. Amit Singh, Mr. ajay Prajapati, Mr. Aman Pathak, Mr. Arvind Gupta, Advocates.

IMPORTANT

Dismissal of application for quashing of criminal proceedings by High Court - Inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on Court to act according to its whims and fancies.

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, Section 3 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482 - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Section 5 - Criminal proceedings against sister-in-law by brother-in-law - Quashing of - Allegations against accused that she got married without any divorce from her previous husband and forgery committed in preparing Nikah Nama to take compassionate appointment in place of her husband - Held, power of quashing of criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of rare cases and not justified for Court in embarking upon enquiry as to reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in FIR or complaint and that inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on Court to act according to its whims and fancies - No material placed on record by complainant to justify bald allegations made in complaint on basis of which FIR was registered - No offence made out against accused - Hence, criminal proceedings liable to be quashed.

[Paras 17 and 18]

Cases Referred :-

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918.

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.

JUDGMENT

Ajay Rastogi, J. - Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 8th September, 2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad declining to interfere in the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant at the instance of respondent no.2/complainant (bother-in-law of the appellant).

3. The case of the appellant is that she was born in a Hindu family and was married in May 2009 when she was a minor (17 years) to one Shiv Gobind Prajapati with whom she never stayed and the marriage was never consummated. In the divorce petition which was filed by Shiv Gobind Prajapati, it was admitted that the marriage was never consummated and this marriage was dissolved through Village Panchayat in 2014 between the families of the appellant and Shiv Gobind Prajapati, who thereafter married another woman, Suman Prajapati and this marriage being voidable under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 3 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 was dissolved and annulled by the families of the appellant and Shiv Gobind Prajapati.

4. The appellant treating her marriage to be annulled for all practical purposes, while doing her studies in Lucknow, met Mohd. Shameem Khan and they got married on 11th December, 2016 under Sharia law in presence of entire family of her late husband, including respondent no.2/complainant, against the wishes of her family. A certificate of marriage was issued by the competent authority and a translated copy of "Nikah Nama" (Marriage Certificate) was issued by the Languages Department, Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama, Lucknow dated 11th December, 2016.

5. From this marriage, the appellant gave birth to a male child on 23rd September, 2017 and was living happily with her late husband. Unfortunately, her husband passed away on 8 th December, 2017. After the appellant obtained succession certificate in her name and no objection was given by her mother-in-law to the employer of Mohd. Shameem Khan, she got employment in King George Medical University, Lucknow, as Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (A.N.M.) on compassionate grounds by an order dated 19th May, 2018 w.e.f. 28th April, 2018 and being the legally wedded wife of the deceased (late Mohd. Shameed Khan), his terminal dues were paid to her. The fact is that the entire gratuity amount of Rs.4,60,000/- of her late husband was transferred by her to the bank account of her mother in-law. However, the destiny was not humble to her and she was thrown out of her matrimonial home by respondent no.2 with an eleven months old child on 19th August, 2018 and thereafter respondent no.2 made all kinds of malafide, false and frivolous allegations against the appellant, including to the employer of the appellant to remove her from employment.

6. After more than a year, at the instance of respondent no.2, a written complaint/FIR came to be registered against the appellant for offences under Sections 494, 495, 416, 420, 504 & 506 IPC at PS Bazar Khala, District Lucknow, U.P. on 9th July, 2019. Anticipatory bail was granted to the appellant and after charge-sheet came to be filed on 23rd March, 2021 under Sections 494, 420, 504, 506, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, the learned trial Judge took cognizance of the same and summoned the appellant.

7. At this stage, the appellant approached the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the proceedings, but that came to be dismissed by the High Court under impugned order dated 8th September, 2021, which is the subject matter of challenge in the appeal before us.

8. Counsel for the appellant submits that everything was running smoothly in her life, but because of the untimely sad demise of her husband late Mohd. Shameem Khan, her brother-in-law left no stone unturned to pressurize her for handing over all the terminal benefits which she received on account of death of her late husband and was interested to seek compassionate appointment in her place. This was the primary reason for which all uncalled for allegations were levelled against her, including the forgery committed in preparing Nikah Nama.

9. It was alleged in the complaint that before annulment of first marriage, the appellant had entered into marriage with late Mohd. Shameem Khan on 11th December, 2016, and thereafter she started to harass his late brother mentally and physically and that was the reason for which his brother suddenly died during his service on 8th December, 2017. It was further alleged that immediately after his death, there was a sudden change in the behaviour of the appellant and she tried to oust her mother-in-law, sister-in-law and respondent no.2/complainant from the house. Every day, she used to threaten and abuse the family members and by committing a forgery, she obtained the job on compassionate grounds and took all the terminal benefits and the genuine dependents of late Mohd. Shameem Khan (brother of the complainant) were deprived of his terminal benefits and this Nikah (marriage) was solemnized by her without any divorce from her previous husband, on the basis of which the FIR was registered and charges were framed against her.

10. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that it is not a case of the complainant that his brother (deceased) had ever made any complaint of any nature during his lifetime against the appellant in reference to the matrimonial relationship between the appellant and her late husband (Mohd. Shameem Khan) and after his untimely demise, all sort of allegations were levelled by her brother-in-law on the basis of which the FIR was registered.

11. Counsel further submits that there is no iota of evidence to support what is alleged in the complaint by respondent no.2 on the basis of which FIR has been registered and even if what is being stated in the FIR is taken on its face value, prima facie, none of the offences which have been levelled against the appellant in the charge-sheet are made out. In the given circumstances, if the criminal proceedings at this stage are allowed to continue against her, it will be nothing but a clear abuse of the process of law and a mental harassment to the appellant, more so, when she has not only to sustain her employment, but being the only bread winner of her family, she has to take care of her minor son also and further submits that the High Court has not even looked into the prima facie allegations levelled in the FIR on the basis of which charge-sheet came to be filed and just after quoting certain passages from the judgments of this Court, dismissed the petition preferred at her instance under Section 482 Cr.PC.

12. Counsel submits that the principles have been well laid down by this Court in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, and which have been consistently followed in the later years and taking the test as laid down by this Court, what being alleged in the complaint on the basis of which FIR has been registered, even if prima facie taken into consideration, no offence is made out of the kind levelled against her. In the given circumstances, the present proceedings initiated against the appellant deserve to be quashed and set aside being an abuse of the process of law.

13. Counsel for the State and the counsel for the complainant jointly submit that after the FIR was registered, investigation was made and only thereafter the charge-sheet was filed. It can at least be presumed that a prima facie case against her is made out. The High Court has appreciated the material available on record and found no reason to interfere in its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC and the impugned judgment needs no further interference of this Court.

14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

15. The exposition of law on the subject relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC are well settled and to the possible extent, this Court has defined sufficiently channelized guidelines, to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. This Court has held in para 102 in State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others (supra) as under :

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

16. The principles laid down by this Court have consistently been followed, as well as in the recent judgment of three Judge judgment of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 2021 SC 1918.

17. It is no doubt true that the power of quashing of criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in rarest of the rare cases and it was not justified for the Court in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims and fancies.

18. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, there was no material placed on record by the complainant to justify the bald allegations which were made in the complaint on the basis of which FIR was registered. There are undisputed facts on record that the appellant's marriage was solemnized with late Mohd. Shameem Khan on 11th December, 2016 and from this wed-lock, a male child was born on 23rd September, 2017 and her husband untimely passed away on 8th December, 2017 and until their period of matrimonial relationship, no complaint of any kind was ever made by her late husband (Mohd. Shameem Khan) and after she was paid his terminal benefits and got a compassionate appointment in his place as an A.N.M. by an order dated 19th May, 2018 w.e.f. 28th April, 2018, all sort of issues were raised by the complainant (brother of her deceased husband) of making such false allegations with reference to her marriage and also for the terminal benefits which she received and there was not even prima facie foundation to support the nature of allegations which were made.

19. Although it is true that it was not open for the Court to embark upon any enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR, but at least there has to be some factual supporting material for what has been alleged in the FIR which is completely missing in the present case and documentary evidence on record clearly supports that her Nikah Nama was duly registered and issued by competent authority and even the charge sheet filed against her does not prima facie discloses how the marriage certificate was forged.

20. In the given circumstances and going through the complaint on the basis of which FIR was registered and other material placed on record, we are of the considered view that no offence of any kind as has been alleged in the FIR, has been made out against the appellant and if we allow the criminal proceedings to continue, it will be nothing but a clear abuse of the process of law and will be a mental trauma to the appellant which has been completely overlooked by the High Court while dismissing the petition filed at her instance under Section 482 Cr.PC.

21. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant in reference to FIR No.0227 of 2019 dated 9th July, 2019 under Sections 494, 495, 416, 420, 504 & 506 IPC lodged at PS Bazar Khala, District Lucknow, U.P. are hereby quashed and set aside.

22. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

SUPREME COURT: Death sentence imposed by Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court converted into life imprisonment.

LATEST JUDGEMENT

SUPREME COURT: Death sentence imposed by Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court converted into life imprisonment.

The Supreme Court in the judgement dated 24.04.2020 in the case of Arvind Singh Versus State of Maharashtra Criminal Appeal Nos. 640-641 OF 2016 directed against the judgement and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench)

on 5th May, 2016 whereby the appeals filed by the appellants against their conviction for offences punishable under Section 364A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was dismissed by confirming the death sentence imposed upon them by the learned Sessions Judge, Nagpur.

The Supreme Court while considering all the circumstances and facts on record, opined that the present case falls short of the “rarest of rare” cases where a death sentence alone deserves to be awarded to the appellants. 

The Court said that:- 

"It appears to us in light of all cumulative circumstances that the cause of justice will be effectively served by invoking the concept of special sentencing as evolved by this Court in the cases of Swamy Shraddananda and Sriharan."

 

The Supreme Court Held-

"The death sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, confirmed by the High Court, is converted into the life imprisonment. It is further observed and directed that the life means till the end of the life with the further observation and direction that there shall not be any remission till the accused completes 25 years of imprisonment."

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SUPREME COURT: GENUINENESS OF WILL- Principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of a Will. (DOWNLOAD JUDGEMENT)

LATEST JUDGEMENT

SUPREME COURT: Legal principles applicable to the making of a testamentary document like Will, its proof, and its acceptance by the Court.

The Supreme Court in the judgement dated 24.04.2020 in the case of Shivakumar & ors. Versus Sharanabasappa & ors. Civil Appeal No. 6076 OF 2009 while deciding the appeal challenging the judgement and decree dated 26.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby, the High Court reversed the judgement and decree dated 12.09.2001 passed by the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Koppal which essentially revolved around the question of genuineness of the Will in question.

    The High Court observed while examining the basic contentions of the defendants that by its very nature, the Will appeared to be a fabricated document. After taking note of the discrepancies in the document itself and other unnatural circumstances as also after analysing the evidence of the star witnesses, the High Court found that the Trial Court had erred in deciding the relevant issue in favour of the plaintiffs and, while reversing the findings of the Trial Court, held that the contested Will was not a genuine one. As the consequence, the judgement and decree passed by the Trial Court were set aside.

THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS ESSENTIAL FOR DETERMINATION OF THE CASE:-

1. As to whether the High Court was right in reversing the decision of the Trial Court and in holding that the contested Will was not a genuine document?

2. As to whether the High Court ought to have considered remanding the case to the Trial Court?

WILL – PROOF AND SATISFACTION OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court has laid down the legal principles applicable to the making of a testamentary document like Will, its proof, and its acceptance by the Court.

The Supreme Court Held as follows:-

"The relevant principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of a Will could be broadly summarised as follows:–

1. Ordinarily, a Will has to be proved like any other document; the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind. Alike the principles governing the proof of other documents, in the case of Will too, the proof with mathematical accuracy is not to be insisted upon. 

2. Since as per Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will is required to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and capable of giving evidence.

3. The unique feature of a Will is that it speaks from the death of the testator and, therefore, the maker thereof is not available for deposing about the circumstances in which the same was executed. This introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is the last Will of the testator. The initial onus, naturally, lies on the propounder but the same can be taken to have been primarily discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of a Will. 

4. The case in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stands on a different footing. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the onus heavier on the propounder and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the document give rise to suspicion, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 

5. If a person challenging the Will alleges fabrication or alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion et cetera in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may give rise to the doubt or as to whether the Will had indeed been executed by the testator and/or as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. In such eventuality, it is again a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.

6. A circumstance is “suspicious” when it is not normal or is ‘not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of anormal person’. As put by this Court, the suspicious features must be ‘real, germane and valid’ and not merely the ‘fantasy of the doubting mind.’ 

7. As to whether any particular feature or a set of features qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A shaky or doubtful signature; a feeble or uncertain mind of the testator; an unfair disposition of property; an unjust exclusion of the legal heirs and particularly the dependants; an active or leading part in making of the Will by the beneficiary thereunder et cetera are some of the circumstances which may give rise to suspicion. The circumstances above noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation. 

8. The test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience comes into operation when a document propounded as the Will of the testator is surrounded by suspicious circumstance/s. While applying such test, the Court would address itself to the solemn questions as to whetherthe testator had signed the Will while being aware of its contents and after understanding the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will?

9. In the ultimate analysis, where the execution of a Will is shrouded in suspicion, it is a matter essentially of the judicial conscience of the Court and the party which sets up the Will has to offer cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will."

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Latest Judgement: Supreme Court: NDPS ACT: Small quantity and commercial quantity, decision of SC in E. Micheal Raj case (2008) overruled.

The Supreme Court of India in the Judgement of Hira Singh versus Union of India dated 22.04.2020 has overruled decision of the Supreme Court in the case of E. Micheal Raj v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau (2008) 5 SCC 161 in which it was held that when any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance is found mixed with one or more neutral substance/s, for the purpose of imposition of punishment it is the content of the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance which shall be taken into consideration (paragraphs 15 and 19)

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(I). The decision of this Court in the case of E. Micheal Raj (Supra) taking the view that in the mixture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of the neutral substance(s) is not to be taken into consideration while determining the small quantity or commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance and only the actual content by weight of the offending narcotic drug which is relevant for the purpose of determining whether it would constitute small quantity or commercial quantity, is not a good law; 

(II). In case of seizure of mixture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of neutral substance(s) is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with actual content by weight of the offending drug, while determining the “small or commercial quantity” of the Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances; 

(III). Section 21 of the NDPS Act is not stand-alone provision and must be construed along with other provisions in the statute including provisions in the NDPS Act including Notification No.S.O.2942(E) dated 18.11.2009 and Notification S.O 1055(E) dated 19.10.2001;

(IV). Challenge to Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001, fails and it is observed and held that the same is not ultra vires to the Scheme and the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act. Consequently, writ petitions and Civil Appeal No. 5218/2017 challenging the aforesaid notification stand dismissed.

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Case Laws on Handwriting

Case Laws on Handwriting

# 1. Murari Lal v. State of MP, AIR 1980 SC 531

In the said judgment Apex Court had discussed the entire case law relating to Handwriting Expert Evidence, thus relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced as under:-

We will first consider the argument, a Stale argument often heard, particularly in criminal courts, that the opinion- evidence of a handwriting expert should not be acted upon without substantial corroboration. We shall presently point out how the argument cannot be justified on principle or precedent.

We begin with the observation that the expert is no accomplice. There is no justification for condemning his opinion evidence to the same class of evidence as that of an accomplice and insist upon corroboration. True, it has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert.

But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not because experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses – the equality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witness -, but because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation, some error of premises or honest mistake of conclusion.

The more developed and the more perfect a science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The science of identification of finger-prints has attained near perfection and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non- existent. On the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher.

But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him.

An expert deposes and not decides. His duty ‘is to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable the judge to form his own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence’.

(Vide Lord President Cooper in Decie v. Edinburgh Magistrate, 1953 SC 34 quoted by Professor Cross in his Evidence).

From the earliest times, courts have received the opinion of experts. As long ago as 1553 it was said in Buckley v. Rice Thomas, (1554) 1 Plowden 118:

“If matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which it concerns. This is a commendable thing in our law. For thereby it appears that we do not dismiss all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them and encourage them as things worthy of commendation.”

Expert testimony is made relevant by S. 45 of the Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon a point as to identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person ‘specially skilled’ ‘in questions as to identity of handwriting’ is expressly made a relevant fact. There is nothing in the Evidence Act, as for example like Illustration (b) to Section 114 which entitles the Court to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars, which justifies the court in assuming that a handwriting expert’s opinion is unworthy of credit unless corroborated.

The Evidence Act itself (S. 3) tells us that ‘a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’. It is necessary to occasionally remind ourselves of this interpretation clause in the Evidence Act lest we act on artificial standard of proof not warranted by the provisions of the Act.

Further, under S. 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case.

It is also to be noticed that S. 46 of the Evidence Act makes facts, not otherwise relevant, relevant if they support or are inconsistent with the opinion of experts, when such opinions are relevant. So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of a handwriting expert and there need to no initial suspicion.

But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no hard and fast rule, but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated.

The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it.

Apart from principle, let us examine if precedents justify invariable insistence on corroboration. We have referred to Phipson on Evidence, Cross on Evidence, Roscoe on Criminal Evidence, Archibald on Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice and Halsbury’s Laws, England but we were unable to find a single sentence hinting at such a rule.

# 2. Ram Chandra v. U. P. State, AIR 1957 SC 381

Jagannadha Das, J. observed; “It may be that normally it is not safe to treat expert evidence as to handwriting as sufficient basis for conviction.” ‘May’ and ‘normally’ make our point about the absence of an inflexible rule.

# 3. Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad Isa, (1963) 3 SCR 722,

Gajendragadkar, J. observed; “Evidence given by expert can never be conclusive, because after all it is opinion evidence”, a statement which carries us nowhere on the question now under consideration. Nor, can the statement be disputed because it is not so provided by the Evidence Act and, on the contrary, S. 46 expressly makes opinion evidence challenge-able by facts, otherwise irrelevant.

And as Lord President Cooper observed in Davis v. Edinburgh Magistrate : “The parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert”.

# 4. Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 529

Wanchoo, J., after noticing various features of the opinion of the expert said: “We do not consider in the circumstances of this case that the evidence of the expert is conclusive and can falsify the evidence of the attesting witnesses and also the circumstances which go to show that this Will must have been signed in 1943 as it purports to be.

Besides, it is necessary to observe that expert’s evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on such evidence it is usual to see if it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.

In the present case the probabilities are against the expert’s opinion and the direct testimony of the two attesting witnesses which we accept is wholly inconsistent with it”. So, there was acceptable direct testimony which was destructive of the expert’s opinion; there were other features also which made the expert’s opinion unreliable.

The observations regarding corroboration must be read in that context and it is worthy of note that even so the expression used was ‘it is usual’ and not ‘it is necessary’.

# 5. Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1326 : 1967 Cri LJ 1197

Hidayatullah, J. said: “Both under S. 45 and S. 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting form frequent observations and experience. In either case the Court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. One such means open to the Court is to apply its own observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the disputed one, not to become a handwriting expert but to verify the premises of the expert in the one case and to appraise the value of the opinion in the other case.

This comparison depends on an analysis of the characteristics in the admitted or proved writings and the finding of the same characteristics in large measure in the disputed writing. In this way the opinion of the deponent whether expert or other is subjected to scrutiny and although relevant to start with becomes probative. Where an expert’s opinion is given, the Court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that the two writings are by the same person.

This is not to say that the Court must play the role of an expert but to say that the Court accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert or other witness”. These observations lend no support to any requirement as to corroboration of expert testimony. On the other hand, the facts show that the Court ultimately did act upon the uncorroborated testimony of the expert though the judges took the precaution of comparing the writing themselves.

This Court had again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to handwriting and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, the court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial.

# 6. Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1091

It was said by this Court: “… but we think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law.

# 7. Ram Chandra v. State of U. P., AIR 1957 SC 381

It is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence.

आप सभी के लिए 125 सीआरपीसी के महत्वपूर्ण आदेशों की सूची Some most important Judgments related to 125 Cr.P.C.

👍आप सभी के लिए 125 सीआरपीसी के महत्वपूर्ण आदेशों की सूची
Some most important Judgments related to 125 Cr.P.C.

1. 125 CrPC cannot be filed twice, only 127 CrPC is allowed. (High Court Gujrat), Bench Hbl J. M. R. Shah, Order on 30-08-2011, Cr RA/69/2011 8/8, Revision Appeal No. 69 of 2011, Chauhan Anjanaben Jayantibhai Vs Chauhan Kanaiyalal Mohanlal.(Chauhan vs Chauhan)

2. No Multiple maintenances are allowed. (High Court Gujrat), Bench Hbl J. Akhil Kureshi, order on 21-10-2010, Special Appeal No. 2080 of 2010, SCR. A/2080/2010, 2/2, Hemlataben Maheshbhai Chauhan Vs State of Gujarat.

3. Multiple petitions of maintenance are not allowed. (High Court Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 30-08-10, Crl. M. C. No. 130/2010 and Crl. M. A. No. 504/2010, Rachna Kathuria vs Ramesh Kathuria. Citation No. 173 (2010) DLT 289.

4. Double Jeopardy. Same relief of maintenance cannot be asked twice in two different courts. Litigant cannot ride two horses. (High Court Mumbai), Bench Hbl B. Wahane, J. Order on 17-07-1991. Ravindra Haribhau Karmarkar Vs Mrs. Shaila R. Karmarkar. Citation No. 1992 Cri LJ 1845.

5. Separate income of wife can be taken in to account in determining the amount of maintenance payable to her. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. Sarkaria R. Singh, Chandrachud Y.V., Gupta A.C., Order on 17-10-1974, Bhagwan Dutt Vs Kamla Devi and Ors. Citation Nos. 1975 AIR 83; 1975 SCR (2) 483; 1975 SCC (2) 386; Citator R 1986 SC 984 (5), R 1987 SC 1100 (5).

6. No parallel 125CrPC and DVA for maintenance. (High Court Delhi), Bench Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 22-09-2010, Crl. R. P. No. 633 of 2010, Crl M. A. No. 15451/ 2010, Renu Mittal Vs Anil Mittal & Ors. Citation No. 173 (2010) DLT 269.

7. Interim maintenance increase illegal. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. B.N. Agarwal and G. S. Singhvi, Order on 23-02-2009, Civil Appeal No. 1163/2009, SLP (C) No. 16742 of 2006, Sanjeev Gupta Vs Salini Gupta. Citation No. 2009 INSC 390 (23 February 2009); II (2012 DMC 705.

8. Claim of high status of husband is not sufficient for interim maintenance. (High Court Delhi), Bench Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhigra, order on 01-09-2010, Crl M. C. No. 4066 of 2009 and Crl. M. A. No. 13807 of 2009, Amit Khanna Vs Priyanka Khanna.

9. Interim Maintenance cannot be increased based on husband salary hike. (High Court Mumbai), Bench Hbl R. S. Dalvi, J. order 26-02-2010, W. P. No. 6686 of 2009, Ritula Singh Vs Lt. Col. Rajeswar Singh.

10. Children can claim maintenance from mother. Punishment awarded U/s 193 IPC to wife for providing false evidence to the court. (High Court Delhi), Hbl J. Dr.S. Murlidharan, order on 23-03-2009, Crl. M. C. 1130/2008 & Crl. M. A. 4231/ 2008, Jagdish Prasad Vs State of NCT Delhi & Ors.

11. Maintenance arrears of one year only from the date of filing the petition. (High Court AP), Hbl D.J. Raju, J., order on 31 March 1984, Jangam Srinivasa Rao Vs Jangam Rajeswari & ors. Citation No. 1990 Cri LJ 2506.

12. Take EMI into consideration in maintenance and reduced maintenance. (Supreme Court), Hbl A. Kabir and C. Joseph, JJ., order on 28-08-2009, Crl Appeal No. 879 of 2009, Arising on SLP ( Crl.) No. 7503 of 2008, SLP (Crl.) No. 7924 of 2008, Bhushan Kumar Meen Vs Mansi Meen @ Harpreet Kaur. Citation Nos. (2010) 15 SCC 372 A; (2010) 15 SCC 372 B.

13. Wife cannot take advantage of two orders of maintenance passed by civil as well as criminal court. (HC Maharastra), Bench Hbl R. Lodha J., order on 13-09-1995, Gomaji Vs Smt. Yasoda & Ors. Citation No. 1(1996) DMC 487; II (1996) DMC 469.

14. Working wife no maintenance in HMA 24, 125 CrPC only for child. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. T. Chatterjee and H. Dattu, order on 23 March 2009, Civil Appeal Nos. 1789-1790 of 2009, SLP (C) Nos. 24589-24590 of 2007, Anu Kaul Vs Rajeev Kaul. Citation Nos. (2009) INSC 582 (23 March 2009); (2009) 13 SCC 209.

15. Meaning of unable to maintain in 125 CrPC and grounds for maintenance. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl J. Dr. Arijit Pasayat, order on 27-11-2007, Appeal Cr. 1627 of 2007 arising on SLP No. (Crl.) 4379 of 2006, Chaturbhuj Vs Sita bai. Citation Nos. (2008) 2 SCC 316; AIR 2008 SC 530; 2008 (I0 KLT 41 (SC).

16. Maintenance awarded in two sections is offset. (HC Punjab and Haryana), Coram Mr. J. S. D. Anand, order on 23-02-2010, Civil revision No. 2427 of 2009, Gian Chand Vs Dilpreet Kaur.

17. Liability of maintenance of children is co-extensive in 2:1 when both parents are working. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl J. D. P. Wadhwa, order 28-03-2000, AIR 2000 SC 1398, I (200) DMC 621, 2000 II OLR SC 85, Padmja Sharma Vs Ratan Lal Sharma. Citation No. (2000) 4 SCC 266.

18. Meaning to unable to maintenance. (Supreme Court), Bench, Hbl P. Sathasivam, J, .order 20 July 2011, Civil Appeal Nos. 5831-5833 of 2011, Arising SLP (C) Nos. 20518-20520 of 2009, Vinny Parmar Vs Paramvir. Citation No. AIR 2011 SC 2748; (2011) 7 SCALE 741.

19. No maintenance to earning spouse. (HC Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 18-09-2008, CM (M) 949/ 08, Manish Kumar Vs Pratibha.

20. No maintenance if wife lies. (SC), Bench Hbl JJ.. G. S. Singhvi and Ashok Kumar Ganguli, order on 03-12-2009, Civil Appeal No. 5239 of 2009, Dalip Singh Vs State of Up and Ors. Citation No. (2010) 2 SCC 114.

21. Reduced interim maintenance. (SC), Hbl J. R. M. Lodha, order on 20-07-2010, Appeal No. 5660 of 2010, Arising SLP (C) No. 6736 of 2007, Neeta Rakesh Jain Vs Rakesh Jeetmal Jain. Citation No. AIR 2010 SC 3540; (2010) 12 SCC 242; 2010 (7) JT I 76 (SC).

22. Wife is not entitled to maintenance who deserted her husband. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. S. Ahmed & D. Wadhwa, order on 02-03-200, AIR 2000 SC 952, 2000(2) ALD Cri 15, 2000Cr. LJ 1498, Rohtash Singh Vs Smt. Ramendrei & Ors. Citation No. (2000) 3 SCC 180; JT 2000 (2) SC 553.

23. Maintenance not granted as it is proved that wife wants to reside separately. No maintenance to deserting wife. (HC Chhattisgarh), Hbl J., L. C. Bhadoo, order on 15 -02-2004, Crl. Revision No. 544/2003, Shiv Kumar Yadav Vs Santoshi Yadav.

24. Husband can get PF details of wife. (CIC, Delhi), Decision No. 1816/ IC (A) 2008, F No. CIC/MA/A/2007/00583, Prof M.M. Ansari, order on 10 Jan 2008.

25. Wife guilty of contempt of court, maintenance denied with cost. (HC Delhi), Hbl J. S. N. Dhingra, order on 25-01-2010, Cont. Case (C) 482 of 2008, Gurbinder Singh Vs Manjit Kaur.

26. Children have to maintain their parents. (High Court Gujrat), Hbl J. Akhil Kureshi, order on 09-02-2011, CR RA/759 of 2009, 4/4, Hasmukhbhai Narayan Bhai Viramiya Vs State & Ors.

27. Conditions when maintenance to be paid. (High Court Delhi), Mr. Pradeep Nandrajog J., order reserved on 02-04-2007, order on 14-04-2007, CM (M) No. 367 of 2007, Alok Kumar Jain Vs Purnima Jain. Citation No. 2007 (96) DRJ 115.

28. All states amends in Sec 125 CrPC is invalid. (SC), Bench Hbl M. Katju, Gyan Sudha Mishra JJ., order on 11 Jan 2011, Crl Appeal No. 107 of 2011, SLP (Crl) No. 6568 of 2009, Manoj Yadav Vs Pushpa Yadav. Citation No. 2011 : 1 L.W. (Crl.) 520.

29. Wife should clear that she is unable to maintain her. No maintenance to enable wife who deserted her husband. (High Court Karnataka), Bench Hbl J. M. Patil, order on 13-02-1980, Haunsabai Vs Balkrishna Krishna Badigar. Citation Nos. 1981 Cri LJ 110; ILR 1980 KAR 612; 1980 (2) Kar LJ 158.

30. Maintenance on actual earning. (High Court Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order reserved 25-07-2008, order on 18-09-2008, CM (M) No. 1790 of 2006 and CM No. 1435 of 2006, Ritu Raj Kant Vs Anita. Citation No. 154 (2008) DLT 505.

31. Maintenance denied for working wife. (High Court Madras), Hbl A. S. Venkatachalamoorthy J., order on 21-06-2002, Kumaresan Vs Aswathi. Citation No. (2002) 2 MLJ 760.

32. No maintenance for capable and working wife. (High Court Maharastra), Hbl J. C. Chitre J., order on 24-03-2000, Smt. Mamta Jaiswal Vs Rajesh Jaiswal. Citation No. 2000 (4) MPHT 457; II (2000) DMC 170.

33. No maintenance to earning wife, only to children. (High Court Karnataka), Hbl K. Manjunath J., order on 22-08-2005, AIR 2005 Kant 417, ILR 2005 KAR 4981, Dr. E. Shanthi Vs Dr. H K. Vasudev.

34. No Maintenance to working wife in 125 CrPC. (High Court Madras), Hbl P. Sathasivam J., order on 21-01-2003, Manokaran @ Ramamoorthy Vs M. Devaki. Citation Nos. AIR 2003 Mad 212; I (2003) DMC 799; (2003) I MLJ 752 (Mad), CMP No. 16264 of 2002.

35. No Maintenance to wife, but only to child. (HC Mumbai), Hbl J. B. L. Marlapalle, order on 18-7-2009, Appeal No. 20 of 2005 and 144 of 2005, Smt. Manju Kamal Mehra Vs Kamal Puskar Mehra. Citation Nos. 2010 AIR (Bom) 34; 2009 (5) AIIMR 798; Legal/ 360.in 114983; LS/Bom/2009/1374.

36. No Maintenance to capable wife. (HC Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 10-09-2008, CM (M) No. 539 of 2008, Vijay Kumar Vs Harsh Lata Aggarwal.

37. No maintenance U/s 125 CrPC when wife deserts hubby without cause and also she is earning. No Maintenance to capable wife, but only to child and no maintenance to wife living in adultery. (HC Uttaranchal), Hbl J. Alok Singh, order on 18-11-2009, Crl. Rev. No. 201 of 2006, Smt. Archana Gupta & ors Vs Rajeev Gupta.

38. Wife should clear that she is unable to maintain herself. (HC Allahabad), Hbl J. B. Katju, order on 25-03-1976, Manmohan Singh Vs Smt. Mahindra Kaur. Citation No. 1976 Cri LJ 1664.

39. No Maintenance if wife is working. (HC Uttaranchal), Hbl J. Dharamveer, order on 25-10-2010, Crl Rev. No. 88 of 2002, Vikas Jain Vs Deepali @ Ayushi. Citation No. LAWS (UTN) 2010-1-36.

40. Wife living separate troubled in family no maintenance. (HC Madras), Hbl J. P. R. Shiva Kumar, order on 22-02-2008, Crl. R. C. No. 1491 of 2005, Marimuthu Vs Janaki. Citation No. AIR 2003 Mad 212; I (2003) DMC 799; (2003) I MLJ 752.

41. No maintenance to wife who left her husband. (HC Mumbai), Hbl V. R. Kingaonkar J., order on 08-04-2008, Cri R.A. 226 of 2002, Sanjay Sudhkar Bhosle Vs Khristina. Citation No. 2008 (2) Bom. C.R. (Cri) 467.

42. No maintenance to deserted wife who denied to live with husband. (HC Gujarat), Hbl G. L. Gupta J., order on 22-01-1999, Crl. Rev. No. 179 of 1997, Crl P. C. 2 of 1974 S. 125, Bheeka Ram Vs Goma Devi & Ors.Citation No. 1999 CRLJ 1789.

43. No alimony to wife who deserted her husband. (HC Punjab and Haryana), Hbl Mohinder Pal J., order on 19-03-2009, Crl Misc No. M-24684 of 2008 (O&M), Poonam Vs Mahender Kumar.

44. Husband parent’s property should not be counted in maintenance. (High Court Delhi), Hbl J. Aruna Suresh, order on 02-07-2010, CM (M) No. 1045 of 2008 and C M No. 13003 of 2008, Sushila Devi Vs Joginder Kumar.

45. Permanent alimony cancelled. (HC Mumbai), Hbl JJ. A. P. Despande and Smt. R. P. Sondurbaldota, order on 08-04-2010, Appeal No. 116 of 2002, Family Court 47/ 2002, Arun Kashinath Despande Vs Inumati R. Deo.

46. Wife deserted her husband, no maintenance. (HC Mumbai), Hbl R. S. Mohite J. , order on 04-02-2005, Meena Dinesh Parmar Vs Dinesh H. Parmar. Citation Nos. AIR 2005 Bom 298; 2005 (4) Bom CR 672; 2005 (2) Mh LJ 305.

47. Wife living separate without reason no maintenance. (HC Kerala), Hbl M. Sashidharan Nambiar J., order on 03-12-2010, Crl MC No. 1893 of 2006, Manoshanthi & Ors Vs Ramachandran & State.

48. Wife living separate from husband not entitled for maintenance. (HC Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 27-08-2010, Crl M C No. 491 of 2009, Sanjay Bhardwaj Vs State & Anr. Citation No. 2010 (118) DRJ 385.

49. Qualified wife should work for maintenance. (HC Delhi), Hbl J. Shiv Narayan Dhingra, order on 01-10-2008, CM (M) 1153 of 2008 (DEL) , Kavita Prasad Vs Ram Ashrey Prasad.

50. 125 CrPC is Civil in Nature. (Supreme Court), Hbl Dr. Arijit Pasayat J., order on 05-06-2007, Appeal (Crl.) 795 of 2001, Iqbal Bano Vs State of UP & Ors. Citation Nos. AIR 2007 SC 2215; (2007) 6 SCC 785; 2007 AIR SWC 3880; (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 258; Cr LR (SC) 554.

51. NBW cannot be issued for nonpayment of maintenance. (HC Kerala), Hbl J. Sashidharan Nambiar, order on 10-12-2010, Crl MC No. 4843 of 2010, Shanvas Vs Raseena & State of Kerala.

52. Magistrate can grant interim maintenance. (Supreme Court), Bench Hbl JJ. Venkataramiah E.S.T., Mishra R.B., order on 09-10-1985, Savitri Vs Govind Singh Rawat. Citation Nos. 1986 AIR SC 984; 1985 SCC (4) 337; 1985 SCALE (2) 697.

53. Wife’s property, income sources must be considered in CrPC 125. Also the order of maintenance if made to pay from date of application, need not record the reason for doing so. In general it is payable from date of order. (SC) Hbl C.K. Thakker, and D. K. Jain , JJ. Order on 28 July 2008, Civil Appeal No. 4666 of 2008, Shail Kumari Devi & Anr Vs Krishan Bhagwan Pathak @ Kishun B. Pathak. Citation No. AIR 2008 SC 3006; (2008) 9 SCC 632; 2008 (3) ALT (Crl) 171 (SC).

54. No maintenance in the Domestic Violence Act 2005, 125 CrPC is applicable. (HC Bombay), Nagpur Hbl M. L. Tahaliyani J. , Order on May 05, 2014. WP No. 32 of 2014, Koushik Vs Sau Sangeeta Koushik and Ors.

55. Wife fined 2 Lakhs wrt DV Act proceedings for “making mockery of the judicial process”, Contempt and for suppression of facts. (HC Delhi), Hbl J. Vipin Sanghi, reserved on 20-12-2011 Order on 21-02-2012, CONT, CAS (C) 815/2011 and C.M. No. 20360/2011, Douglas Breckenridge Vs Jhilmil Breckenridge.

56. Maintenance in 125 CrPC from the date of order. (HC Calcutta), Hbl J, Ashim Kumar Roy, Order on 05-03-2010, C.R.R. No. 257 of 2005, Sudarshan Agarwal Vs The State of West Bengal & Anr. Citation No. LS/Cal 2010/265.

57. Not doing cross examination of other witness on one pretext to other, punished with cost of Rs. 25,000/- with warning. (HC Delhi), Hbl, J, S.N. Dhingra, Order on March 09, 2010, CM (M) No. 496/2009, Rampyari & Ors. Vs Ms. Kamlesh.

58. Steps made for the trial Courts while dealing with the civil trials. Punishment imposed Rs. 2 Lakhs on producing false documents, concealment of the facts and false & fabricated frivolous litigation to get wrongdoers benefits. (SC), Hbl JJ, Dalveer Bhandari and Deepak Verma, date of Order July, 4, 2011, Civil Appeal Nos. 4912 -4913 of 2011, Arising SLP (C) Nos. 3157-31-58 of 2011, Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors. Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors. Citation Nos. (2011) 8 SCC 249; 2011(6) SCALE 677; JT 2011 (8) SC 90; 2011 AIR SCW 4000; 2011 (4) Supreme 625.

59. HC on double jeopardy, Article 20(2) of Constitution of India specifies that a person once trialed for an offence cannot be made to trial for same or some other offence on same set of fact and for same cause of actions. The same is termed as Double Jeopardy in criminal cases and Section 300 covers it in civil cases. (HC Madras) Madurai Bench, Coram Hbl J, V. Periya Karuppiah, date of Order 28/04/2009, Crl.O.P.(MD) No.11066 of 2008 and M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2009, K. Kamala & Anr. Vs M.Parimala & Ors. Citation No. 2009 (3) MLJ (Crl) 450.

60. No alimony to wife who deserted her husband. (SC) Uphold decision of HC Punjab and Haryana. Revision petition Dismissed. Hbl JJ V. S. Sirpurkar and Sudarshan Reddy, Order on 16-11-2009, SPL CRL MP No (s) 18899, Poonam Vs Mahender Kumar.

61. Wife shall be entitled to claim maintenance under one of the two orders of the Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC and the District Judge, under Section 24 HMA Act respectively and it would be for her to choose as to which of the two orders she wants to enforce. ( HC Haryana and Punjab). Hbl G.S. Chahal, Order on 25-09-1991, Paramjit Kaur Vs Surinder Singh. Citation No. (1992) 101 PLR 155.

62. This reasoning of the learned Chief Justice appeals to us.
We are concerned with the Code which is complete on the topic and any defence against and order passed under section 125 Crl.P.C. must be founded on a provision in the Code. Section 125 CrPC is a provisionto protect the weaker of the two parties, namely, the neglected wife. If an order for maintenance has been made against the deserter it will operate until vacated or altered in terms of the provisions of the Code itself. If the husband has a case under Section 125 (4) (5) or section 127 of the Code it is open to him to initiate appropriate proceedings.
But until the original order for maintenance is modified or cancelled by a higher Court or is varied or vacated in terms of section 125 (4) or (5) or section 127, its validity survives. It is enforceable and no plea that there has been cohabitation in interregnum or that there has been a compromise between the parties can hold good as a valid defence. (SC) Bench Hbl JJ Krishna Iyer , V.R., Shingal, P.N., and Sen, A.P., Review Petition No. 95 of 1978; Order on 13-11-1978.

Bhupinder Singh Vs Daljit Kaur. Citation No. 1979 AIR 442, 1979 SCR (2) 292, 1979 SCC (3) 352