Case Laws on Handwriting

Case Laws on Handwriting

# 1. Murari Lal v. State of MP, AIR 1980 SC 531

In the said judgment Apex Court had discussed the entire case law relating to Handwriting Expert Evidence, thus relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced as under:-

We will first consider the argument, a Stale argument often heard, particularly in criminal courts, that the opinion- evidence of a handwriting expert should not be acted upon without substantial corroboration. We shall presently point out how the argument cannot be justified on principle or precedent.

We begin with the observation that the expert is no accomplice. There is no justification for condemning his opinion evidence to the same class of evidence as that of an accomplice and insist upon corroboration. True, it has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert.

But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not because experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses – the equality of credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares with all other witness -, but because all human judgment is fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation, some error of premises or honest mistake of conclusion.

The more developed and the more perfect a science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The science of identification of finger-prints has attained near perfection and the risk of an incorrect opinion is practically non- existent. On the other hand, the science of identification of handwriting is not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore, higher.

But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons. It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptability of the reasons given by him.

An expert deposes and not decides. His duty ‘is to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable the judge to form his own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence’.

(Vide Lord President Cooper in Decie v. Edinburgh Magistrate, 1953 SC 34 quoted by Professor Cross in his Evidence).

From the earliest times, courts have received the opinion of experts. As long ago as 1553 it was said in Buckley v. Rice Thomas, (1554) 1 Plowden 118:

“If matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which it concerns. This is a commendable thing in our law. For thereby it appears that we do not dismiss all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them and encourage them as things worthy of commendation.”

Expert testimony is made relevant by S. 45 of the Evidence Act and where the Court has to form an opinion upon a point as to identity of handwriting, the opinion of a person ‘specially skilled’ ‘in questions as to identity of handwriting’ is expressly made a relevant fact. There is nothing in the Evidence Act, as for example like Illustration (b) to Section 114 which entitles the Court to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars, which justifies the court in assuming that a handwriting expert’s opinion is unworthy of credit unless corroborated.

The Evidence Act itself (S. 3) tells us that ‘a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’. It is necessary to occasionally remind ourselves of this interpretation clause in the Evidence Act lest we act on artificial standard of proof not warranted by the provisions of the Act.

Further, under S. 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case.

It is also to be noticed that S. 46 of the Evidence Act makes facts, not otherwise relevant, relevant if they support or are inconsistent with the opinion of experts, when such opinions are relevant. So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of a handwriting expert and there need to no initial suspicion.

But, on the facts of a particular case, a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no hard and fast rule, but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated.

The approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it.

Apart from principle, let us examine if precedents justify invariable insistence on corroboration. We have referred to Phipson on Evidence, Cross on Evidence, Roscoe on Criminal Evidence, Archibald on Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice and Halsbury’s Laws, England but we were unable to find a single sentence hinting at such a rule.

# 2. Ram Chandra v. U. P. State, AIR 1957 SC 381

Jagannadha Das, J. observed; “It may be that normally it is not safe to treat expert evidence as to handwriting as sufficient basis for conviction.” ‘May’ and ‘normally’ make our point about the absence of an inflexible rule.

# 3. Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad Isa, (1963) 3 SCR 722,

Gajendragadkar, J. observed; “Evidence given by expert can never be conclusive, because after all it is opinion evidence”, a statement which carries us nowhere on the question now under consideration. Nor, can the statement be disputed because it is not so provided by the Evidence Act and, on the contrary, S. 46 expressly makes opinion evidence challenge-able by facts, otherwise irrelevant.

And as Lord President Cooper observed in Davis v. Edinburgh Magistrate : “The parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert”.

# 4. Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 529

Wanchoo, J., after noticing various features of the opinion of the expert said: “We do not consider in the circumstances of this case that the evidence of the expert is conclusive and can falsify the evidence of the attesting witnesses and also the circumstances which go to show that this Will must have been signed in 1943 as it purports to be.

Besides, it is necessary to observe that expert’s evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on such evidence it is usual to see if it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.

In the present case the probabilities are against the expert’s opinion and the direct testimony of the two attesting witnesses which we accept is wholly inconsistent with it”. So, there was acceptable direct testimony which was destructive of the expert’s opinion; there were other features also which made the expert’s opinion unreliable.

The observations regarding corroboration must be read in that context and it is worthy of note that even so the expression used was ‘it is usual’ and not ‘it is necessary’.

# 5. Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1326 : 1967 Cri LJ 1197

Hidayatullah, J. said: “Both under S. 45 and S. 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting form frequent observations and experience. In either case the Court must satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon. One such means open to the Court is to apply its own observation to the admitted or proved writings and to compare them with the disputed one, not to become a handwriting expert but to verify the premises of the expert in the one case and to appraise the value of the opinion in the other case.

This comparison depends on an analysis of the characteristics in the admitted or proved writings and the finding of the same characteristics in large measure in the disputed writing. In this way the opinion of the deponent whether expert or other is subjected to scrutiny and although relevant to start with becomes probative. Where an expert’s opinion is given, the Court must see for itself and with the assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be held that the two writings are by the same person.

This is not to say that the Court must play the role of an expert but to say that the Court accept the fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is safe to accept the opinion whether of the expert or other witness”. These observations lend no support to any requirement as to corroboration of expert testimony. On the other hand, the facts show that the Court ultimately did act upon the uncorroborated testimony of the expert though the judges took the precaution of comparing the writing themselves.

This Court had again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to handwriting and it uttered a note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence, the court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial.

# 6. Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1091

It was said by this Court: “… but we think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with more caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law.

# 7. Ram Chandra v. State of U. P., AIR 1957 SC 381

It is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence.