Ram Pratap versus The State of Haryana (01.12.2022) (SC)

 

NON-REPORTABLE

 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Before:- J. B.R. Gavai and J. Vikram Nath

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 804 of 2011

Date of decision: 01.12.2022

 

Ram Pratap – Petitioner

Versus

The State of Haryana – Respondent

 

J U D G M E N T

 

B.R. GAVAI, J. 

1.          This appeal arises out of the Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, vide which it set aside the conviction of the present appellant – Ram Pratap under Section 120-B of IPC, while maintaining the conviction for the offence under 302 of the IPC. The High Court also confirmed the sentence of life imprisonment. In so far as the acquittal of the other accused are concerned, the High Court maintained the same. 

2.          The prosecution story in a nutshell is that the deceased - Om Prakash was on visiting terms with the present appellant/ accused- Ram Pratap. On 13^th December 2007 at 10:00 AM, the accused Ram Pratap visited the house of the deceased - Om Prakash and after taking tea both went together. At 12 midnight, the present appellant - Ram Pratap along with others came to the house of deceased with his dead body in a jeep. He met Jagdish Chander (PW - 4), the brother of the deceased and told him that the deceased died at his house. On the basis of the complaint of Jagdish Chander (PW-4), an FIR came to be registered. Upon completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed against the four accused persons. 

3.          In so far as the evidence of Jagdish Chander (PW - 4) is concerned, when he reported the matter to the police on the basis of which FIR was registered, he had only expressed a suspicion against the present appellant. We further find that there was a delay of 14 hours in reporting the incident to the police. 

4.          The learned trial Court relying upon the evidence of PW-4, PW-7 and PW-8 held that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt against the present appellant. Further, on the basis of the same evidence, the Trial Judge acquitted the other accused whose acquittal has been upheld by the High Court. 

5.          The High Court, while confirming the conviction of the appellant, relied upon the evidence of Jagdish Chander (PW-4). Further, the High Court specifically records that Bhagwana (PW-5), the brother-in-law of the deceased, who was the witness to the last seen, has turned hostile and thus did not support the prosecution case. 

6.          We have heard Mr. Mayank Dahiya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant and Mr. Dinesh Chander Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent State. 

7.          The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent - State submitted that the High Court as well as the trial court have grossly erred in convicting the appellant when there is no evidence worth the namesake. The learned counsel for the respondent – State submitted that the trial court as well as the High Court has appreciated the evidence in the correct perspective and no interference is warranted.

8.          Undisputedly, the present case is a case based on circumstantial evidence. 

9.          It has been held by this Court in a catena of cases including Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reported at (1984) 4 SCC 116, that suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has held that there is not only a grammatical but also a legal distinction between ‘may’ and ‘must’. For proving a case based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish each and every circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, and further, that the circumstances so proved must form a complete chain of evidence so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show, in all human probability, that the act has been done by the accused. Further, it has been held that the facts so established must exclude every hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. 

10.      In the present case, if the evidence of Jagdish Chander (PW - 4) is to be appreciated wherein he has stated that the accused came to his house and informed him that he has killed the deceased-Om Prakash, such statement does not find any mention in the oral report. Apart from this, the delay of 14 hours in lodging the oral report has not been sufficiently explained. The only witness of the last seen theory, i.e. PW-5, has turned hostile and has thus been disbelieved. 

11.      Apart from that, the trial court disbelieved the very same evidence in so far as the other four accused were concerned. The said acquittal has also been found to be valid by the High Court. 

12.      In that view of the matter, we find that the High Court as well as the trial court were not justified in convicting the appellant. The appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted of the charges. The bail bonds stand cancelled. 

 

13.      Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

M/S TECH SHARP ENGINEERS PVT. LTD. Versus SANGHVI MOVERS LIMITED (Supreme Court) (19.09.2022)

 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

M/S TECH SHARP ENGINEERS PVT. LTD. Versus SANGHVI MOVERS LIMITED

September 19, 2022

REPORTABLE

J. INDIRA BANERJEE , J. J.K. MAHESHWARI 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 296 OF 2020 

J U D G M E N T

 Indira Banerjee, J.

     This appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, hereinafter referred to as the “IBC” is against a judgment and order dated 23^rd July 2019 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), New Delhi allowing Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 118 of 2019 filed by the Respondent and setting aside an order dated 2^nd January 2019 passed by the Adjudicating Authority, i.e., the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Chennai whereby the Adjudicating  Authority  had  dismissed  an  application  filed  by  the Respondent as barred by limitation.

2.         Pursuant   to   an   agreement   executed   by   and   between   the Appellant and the Respondent, the Respondent let out on hire to the Appellant, 150 MT crane for erection of equipment at the site of Indian Oil   Corporation   Ltd.   (IOCL)   at   Paradip   in   Odisha.The Respondent/Operational Creditor  raised  invoices  on  the  Appellant between   3^rd   January   2012   and   4^th   March   2013 for   a   sum   of Rs.38,84,709/-.

 

3.         On or about 6^th May 2013, the Respondent issued notice to the Appellant for payment of outstanding hire charges.  By letter dated 17^th May   2013,   the   Appellant   replied   to   the   said   notice.      Further correspondence ensued.

 

4.         Ultimately,  on  14^th  October  2013,  the  Respondent  issued  a statutory notice to the Appellant under Sections 433(e), 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956 for Winding Up of the Appellant-Company. The  Appellant  duly  replied  to  the  notice  on  7^th  November  2013, acknowledging its liability to the Respondent.

 

5.           On  9^th  November  2013,  the  Respondent  called  upon  the Appellant to clear its dues.  On 24^th May 2014, the Respondent issued a statutory notice under Sections 433(e), 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956 calling upon the Appellant to pay Rs.38,84,709/- towards crane hire charges.

 

6.         On or about 22^nd December 2015, the Respondent filed a Winding Up petition dated 4^th  July 2015 in the Madras High Court.   On  5 January 2016, the High Court returned the Winding Up petition to the Respondent  for  curing  of  defects.    The  Winding  Up  petition  was represented on 3^rd February 2016, but again returned on 24^th May 2016 with an endorsement to comply with the defects as intimated earlier.

 

7.         The IBC came into force on 1^st December 2016. Thereafter the Respondent issued a demand notice on 14^th November 2017 under Section 8(1) calling upon the Appellant to repay its dues.

 

8.         On 30^th March 2018, the Respondent filed petition being CP/724/ (IB)/2018 under Section 9 of the IBC for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) in the NCLT.  On 20^th June 2018, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) directed the Registry to issue notice to the Appellant.  

 

9.         By an order dated 2^nd January 2019, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejected the application as barred by limitation, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633.  The application under Section 9 of the IBC was accordingly dismissed.

 

10.       The Respondent appealed to the NCLAT under Section 61 of the IBC.  By the impugned judgment and order, the NCLAT has set aside the order dated 2^nd January 2019 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) rejecting the application of the Respondent under Section 9 of the IBC and has remitted the case to the Adjudicating Authority for admission after notice to the parties.  The NCLAT directed that before admission of the case, it would be open to the Respondent to settle the matter with the Appellant.  The NCLAT held :-

“8. In the present case, it is not in dispute that right to apply under Section 9 accrued to the Appellant on 1^st December, 2016, when ‘I&B Code’ came into force.  Therefore, we find that the application under Section 9 filed by the Appellant is within the period of three years from the date of right to apply accrued.”

 

11.       For the purpose of limitation, the relevant date is the date on which the right to sue accrues which is the date when a default occurs. In  B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra), cited before the NCLT and referred to in the judgment and order impugned, this Court held :-

“42. It is thus clear that since the Limitation Act is applicable to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Code from the inception  of  the  Code,  Article  137  of  the  Limitation  Act  gets attracted. “The right to sue”, therefore, accrues when a default occurs. If the default has occurred over three years prior to the date of filing of the application, the application would be barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, save and except in those cases where, in the facts of the case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act   may   be   applied   to   condone   the   delay   in   filing   such application.”

12.       In  Radha Export (India) Private Ltd. v. K.P. Jayaram and Anr. (2020) 10 SCC 538, this Court referred to  B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and held the application under Section 7 of the IBC to be barred by limitation.

13.       In  Babulal  Vardharji  Gurjar  v.  Veer  Gurjar  Aluminium Industries Private Ltd. and Anr. (2020) 15 SCC 1, this Court held that limitation of three years as provided by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which commenced  from  the  date  of  the  default,  was  extendable  under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

14.       It is well settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court as also different High Courts and, in particular, the judgment of this Court in B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that the NCLT/NCLAT has   the   discretion   to   entertain   an   application/appeal   after   the prescribed period of limitation. The condition precedent for exercise of such discretion is the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the  appeal  and/or  the  application  within  the  period  prescribed  by limitation.

15.       In Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd AIR 1962 SC 361, this Court affirmed the view taken by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan 1889 SCC Online Mad 1 and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the Court a discretion, which is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised, upon principles which are well understood.

16.       The condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause. Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or  rejecting  the  explanation furnished by the Appellant/applicant for the delay in taking steps.

 

17.       When an appeal is filed against an order rejecting an application on the ground of limitation, the onus is on the Appellant to make out sufficient cause for the delay in filing the application.  The date of enforcement of the IBC and/or the date on which an application could have first been filed under the IBC are not relevant in computation of limitation.  It would be absurd to hold that the CIRP could be initiated by filing an application under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC, within three  years  from  the  date  on  which  an  application  under  those provisions of the IBC could have first been made before the NCLT even though the right to sue may have accrued decades ago.

18.       The fact that an application for initiation of CIRP, may have been filed within three years from the date of enforcement of the relevant provisions of the IBC is inconsequential.  What is material is the date on which the right to sue accrues, and whether the cause of action continuous.  

19.       The pendency of the proceedings in a parallel forum, invoked by the  Respondent,  is  not  sufficient  cause  for  the  delay  in  filing  an application under Section 9 of the IBC.  By the time the application was filed, the claim had become barred by limitation.  

20.       In  a  notice  dated  24^th  May  2014  issued  by  the  Respondent demanding payment, it was contended that the Appellant had agreed to pay its outstanding dues in five equated monthly installments of Rs.8,48,053/-. The Appellant had, however, defaulted after payment of one installment for the month of June, 2013. A copy of the petition filed by  the  Respondent  in  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  is enclosed to the paper book.  The Respondent asserted -

 

”The   Petitioner   states   that   without   any   valid   reason   the Respondent delayed the payment for the Services done by the petitioner.    Even  after  repeated  and  constant  follow-up  the Responder did not settle the dues payable to the Petitioner and therefore, the Petitioner issued a notice dated 06.05.2013 and demanded   the   Respondent   to   make   the   payment.      The Respondent sent a reply dated 17.05.2013 and in the said reply the Respondent admitted the outstanding dues and agreed to settle  the outstanding dues  in six months  and  requested  the Petitioner  to  give  discount.    The  Petitioner  issued  a  rejoinder dated  21.05.2013  providing  10%  discount  and  to  settle  the remaining amount in 5 equaled monthly instalment, commencing from 1^st June, 2013.  However, it is made clear that the offer given by rejoinder dated 21.05.2013 is subject to the condition that the Respondent issue and honour the post-dated cheques for the five monthly instalments.

The  Petitioner states  that  the  Respondent sent a  reply  dated 07.06.2013 stating that they are unable to pay 1^st instalment on 01.06.2013   and   informed   that   the   same   will   be   paid   on 20.06.2013.  The Petitioner sent a sur-rejoinder dated 14.06.2013 and asked the Respondent to proceed with the payment schedule proposed by them and it is made very clear that the discount and the waiver of interest offered by the Petitioner is strictly on the condition that the Respondent adhere to the payment schedule. The Respondent paid the 1^st instalment and failed to make any further  payment  and  therefore  the Petitioner  sent  a  reminder dated 02.08.2013. The Respondent did not honour their promise and miserably failed to make payment for the 2^nd instalment and therefore the Petitioner was constrained to revoke their offer and issued notice dated 14.10.2013 demanding the Respondent to pay   Rs.38,84,709/-   (Rupees   Thirty   Eight   Lakhs   Eighty   Four Thousand Seven Hundred and Nine only) with interest.

The Petitioner states that the Respondent issued reply dated 07.11.2013 and confirmed the non-payment of instalments as per their promise and further stated that the Respondent has requested IOCL to make direct payment to the Petitioner and also enclose a draft letter to be sent by the Respondent to IOCL.  The Petitioner sent sur re-rejoinder dated 09.11.2013 and informed the Respondent that the discount offered has been  withdrawn  due  to  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the Respondent.      However,   considering   the   request   of   the Respondent gave final opportunity to settle the dues in two instalments and it was made very clear that any failure on the part of the Respondent to clear dues will result in withdrawal of discounts/waivers and the Respondent has to pay the entire amount of Rs.38,84,709/- (Rupees Thirty Eight Lakhs Eighty Four Thousand Seven Hundred and Nine only).”

21.       From the averments in the Winding Up petition, it is patently clear that there was no acknowledgment of liability after 7^th November 2013.  The last payment was made in June 2013.

 

22.       The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) held :-

 

“On perusal of the Application filed under Section 9 of the I&B Code,   2016,   it   appears   that   the   claim   amounting   to Rs.38,84,709/-  has  become  due  and  payable  on  28.02.2013. There  is  a  single  confirmation  of  the  claim  by  the  Corporate Debtor on 07.11.2013 as reflects from the document placed at page 60 of the typed set filed with the Application. Thereafter, there is nothing on record to suggest that at any point of time the Corporate Debtor confirmed/acknowledged the debt.

In the circumstances, the claim has become time barred and in view the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. -vs- Parag Gupta and Associates (2018 SCC Online SC 1921), the Petition stands dismissed.”

 

23.       It is now well settled that the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under the IBC as far as may be.   Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act which provides for exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation in certain circumstances, provides as follows:

 

“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.—

(1) ...

(2)  In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted  in  good  faith  in a  court  which,  from  defect  of jurisdiction  or  other  cause  of  a  like  nature,  is  unable  to entertain it.”

 

24.       Similarly,   under   Section   18   of   the   Limitation   Act,   an acknowledgment  of  present  subsisting  liability,  made  in  writing  in respect of any right claimed by the opposite party and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, has the effect of commencing of   a   fresh   period   of   limitation,   from   the   date   on   which   the acknowledgment is signed. However, the acknowledgment must be made before the period of limitation expires.

 

25.       Proceedings in good faith in a forum which lacks jurisdiction or is unable to entertain for like nature may save limitation.   Similarly, acknowledgment of liability may have the effect of commencing a fresh period of limitation. 

 

26.       In this case, the last acknowledgment was in 2013 and the Madras High Court neither suffered from any defect of jurisdiction to entertain the winding up application nor was unable to entertain the winding up application for any other cause of a like nature.

 

 

27.       The NCLAT held :-

“From the facts as narrated above, it will be evident that the

winding up petition was filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Madras which had not reached finality and in the meantime, as the ‘I&B Code’ came into force, the demand notice under  Section  8(1)  was  issued  on  14^th  November,  2017  for payment of outstanding amount along with the interest.  Thus, as we find that there is continuous cause of action the claim is within the period of limitation.   The Appellant had moved before an appropriate forum for appropriate relief in time, in accordance with law and so we hold that the claim of the Appellant is not barred by limitation as the petition under Section 433 & 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 become infructuous; by operation of law.”

 

28.       The limitation for  initiation of winding up proceedings  in the Madras High Court stopped running on the date on which the Winding Up petition was filed. The initiation of proceedings in Madras High Court  would  not  save  limitation  for  initiation  of  proceedings  for initiation of CIRP in the NCLT under Section 7 of the IBC.

 

29.       A claim may not be barred by limitation.  It is the remedy for realisation of the claim, which gets barred by limitation.  The impugned order of the NCLAT is unsustainable in law.

 

 

30.       The appeal is allowed.  The impugned order of the NCLAT is set aside.  

 

31.       This judgment, however, will not prevent the Respondent from pursuing any other remedy which the Respondent may be entitled to avail in accordance with law and/or pursue any pending proceedings in accordance with law.