SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: Mandate of Section 50 of NDPS Act confined to personal search only - Non-compliance would not invalidate effect of recovery from vehicle.
State of Punjab v. Baljinder Singh (SC)
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Before :- Uday Umesh Lalit, Indu
Malhotra and Krishna Murari, JJ.
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1565-66 of 2019 (@
Out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5659-5660 of 2019). D/d. 15.10.2019.
State of Punjab - Appellants
Versus
Baljinder Singh & Anr. -
Respondents
For the Appellants :- Ms. Jaspreet
Gogia and Ms. Tanupriya, Advocates.
For the Respondents :- Mr. Naresh
Dilawari, Mr.Mahesh Thakur, Ms. Sheffali Chaudhary, Ms. Vipasha Singh, Ms.
Pallavi Singh, Ms. Vriti Gujral and Mr. G. Balaji, Advocates.
IMPORTANT
Mandate of Section 50 of NDPS Act confined
to personal search only - Non-compliance would not invalidate effect of
recovery from vehicle.
Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Section 50 Recovery of contraband - Non-compliance of
provisions during search - Mandate of Section 50 of Act confined to personal search and not
to search of vehicle or container or premises - Personal search of accused did
not result in recovery of any contraband - However, search of vehicle and
recovery of contraband pursuant thereto stood proved - Merely because there was
non-compliance of Section 50
of Act as far as personal search was concerned, no benefit can be extended so
as to invalidate effect of recovery from search of vehicle - Appeal allowed.
[Para 16]
Cases Referred :
Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746.
Ali Mustaffa, (1994) 6 SCC 569.
Dilip v. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 450.
Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana, (2001) 3 SCC 28.
Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 257.
Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465.
Pirthi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 37.
Pooran Mal, (1974) 1 SCC 345.
State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172.
State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (1996) 1 SCC 288.
Vijaysingh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 1
SCC 609.
JUDGMENT
Uday Umesh Lalit, J. - Leave granted.
2. These appeals arise out of the
judgment [1*] of the High Court [2*] setting aside the
order of conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court against the
present respondents, namely, Baljinder Singh and Khushi Khan.
[1*
Judgment and order Dated 22.1.19 in CRA-D-917-DB/2011 & CRA-D-923-DB/2011]
[2*
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh]
3. The case of the prosecution as set
out in the judgment of the High Court was as under:
"3.
The case of the prosecution in a nutshell is ;that on 19.8.2009 ASI Rakesh
Kumar along with other police officials in connection with patrolling duty were
present at Sirhind bye-pass, Rajpura. Lachhman Singh son of Sarwan Singh came
on the spot. When Rakesh Kumar was talking with Lachhman Singh, a Qualis
bearing registration no. PB- 13-D-7000 was seen coming from Ambala side. On
seeing the police party, the driver of the vehicle tried to reverse the
vehicle. On suspicion, the vehicle was stopped. One lady was sitting with the
driver. On enquiry, the driver and passenger disclosed their identities. ASI
Rakesh Kumar suspected them to be carrying some contraband in the bags lying in
the vehicle. He wanted to search them. He apprised the accused of their right
to get the search conducted in the presence of Magistrate or gazetted Police
Officer. However, accused reposed confidence in him. Joint consent statement of
accused was reduced into writing. On search, 7 bags containing poppy husk were
recovered. Two samples of 250 grams each from each bag were separated and the
residual poppy husk of each bag weighed 34 kgs. All the sample parcels and bulk
parcels were sealed with the seals bearing impression 'RK' Specimen seal was
prepared and the seal after use was handed over to HC Malwinder Singh. The case
property was taken into possession. Ruqa was sent to the police station, on the
basis of which FIR was registered. The case property was deposited in the
Malkhana. On receipt of chemical report and after completing all the codal
formalities, challan was put up in Court against the accused."
4. Thus, according to the prosecution,
accused Baljinder Singh, driver of the vehicle and Khushi Khan who was
accompanying the driver, were guilty of offences punishable under Section 15 of the
Narcotic and Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Act"). As indicated in the above paragraph, the contraband
material found in seven bags contained poppy husk. It is also a matter of
record that the personal search of both the accused was undertaken after their
arrest, which did not lead to any recovery of contraband.
5. The case of the prosecution was
accepted by the Judge, Special Court, Patiala in Sessions Case
No.IIT/17.11.2009/11. By its judgment dated 8.9.2011, the Trial Court concluded
that the aforesaid two accused were guilty of the offence punishable under
Section 15
of the Act and sentenced them to suffer 12 years' rigorous imprisonment with
fine in the sum of L 2 lakhs each, in
default whereof, they were further directed to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for two years.
6. In the appeals preferred by the
accused, the High Court observed that the personal search of the accused was
not conducted before the Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer and as such there was
complete infraction of Section 50 of the Act. Granting benefit on that count,
the High Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the
Trial Court and acquitted both the accused of the charge levelled against them.
7. Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, learned advocate
appearing for the State submitted that the High Court fell in error in not
considering the fact that the search of the vehicle had resulted in recovery of
seven bags of poppy husk containing 34 kgs in each bag. In her submission, though
there may be infraction of the requirement of Section 50 as regards
personal search of the accused, the fact of recovery of material from the
vehicle was an independent factor which ought to be taken into account.
8. Mr. Naresh Dilawari and Ms. Pallavi
Singh, learned advocates appearing for the accused however, submitted that
non-compliance of Section 50
ought to result in acquittal of the accused and as such the view taken by the
High Court was correct.
9. Ms. Pallavi Singh, learned Advocate
also relied upon the decision of this Court in Dilip & Anr v. State
of M.P., [(2007) 1 SCC 450] to submit that once there was
non-compliance of the requirements of Section 50, the benefit ought to be extended in favour
of the accused.
10. The question that arises in the
matter is:-
If
a person found to be in possession of a vehicle containing contraband is
subjected to personal search, which may not be in conformity with the
requirements under Section 50
of the Act; but
the
search of the vehicle results in recovery of contraband material, which stands
proved independently;
would
the accused be entitled to benefit of acquittal on the ground of non-compliance
of Section 50
of the Act even in respect of material found in the search of the vehicle.
11. Before we deal with the question,
we may extract Section 50
of the Act:
"50.
Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted.
(1)
When any officer duly authorised under section 42 is about to search any person under the
provisions of section 41,
section 42
or section 43,
he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary
delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in
section 42 or
to the nearest Magistrate.
(2)
If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can
bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in
sub-section (1).
(3)
The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought
shall, if he sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the
person but otherwise shall direct that search be made.
(4)
No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.
(5)
When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has reason to believe that it is not
possible to take the person to be searched to the nearest Gazetted Officer or
Magistrate without the possibility of the person to be searched parting with
possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, or controlled
substance or article or document, he may, instead of taking such person to the
nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, proceed to search the person as
provided under section 100
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6)
After a search is conducted under sub-section (5), the officer shall record the
reasons for such belief which necessitated such search and within seventy-two
hours send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior."
12. Section 50 of the Act affords protection to a person
in matters concerning "personal search" and stipulates various
safeguards. It is only upon fulfilment of and strict adherence to said
requirements that the contraband recovered pursuant to "personal
search" of a person can be relied upon as a circumstance against the
person.
13. The law which has developed on the
point in some of the judgments of this Court may now be considered.
In State of Punjab v. Baldev
Singh, [(1999) 6 SCC 172] a Constitution Bench of this Court
considered, inter alia, questions as to what would be the resultant effect, in
case the requirements of Section 50 were not complied with. The conclusions
arrived at in para 57 of the decision were as under:
57.
On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following conclusions
arise:
(1)
That when an empowered officer or a duly authorised officer acting on prior
information is about to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform the
person concerned of his right under sub-section (1) of Section 50 of being
taken to the nearest gazetted officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the
search. However, such information may not necessarily be in writing.
(2)
That failure to inform the person concerned about the existence of his right to
be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to
an accused.
(3)
That a search made by an empowered officer, on prior information, without
informing the person of his right that if he so requires, he shall be taken
before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts,
failure to conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, may
not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit article
suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused, where the
conviction has been recorded only on the basis of the possession of the illicit
article, recovered from his person, during a search conducted in violation of
the provisions of Section 50
of the Act. (Underlying by us)
(4)
That there is indeed need to protect society from criminals. The societal
intent in safety will suffer if persons who commit crimes are let off because
the evidence against them is to be treated as if it does not exist. The answer,
therefore, is that the investigating agency must follow the procedure as
envisaged by the statute scrupulously and the failure to do so must be viewed
by the higher authorities seriously inviting action against the official
concerned so that the laxity on the part of the investigating authority is
curbed. In every case the end result is important but the means to achieve it
must remain above board. The remedy cannot be worse than the disease itself.
The legitimacy of the judicial process may come under a cloud if the court is
seen to condone acts of lawlessness conducted by the investigating agency
during search operations and may also undermine respect for the law and may
have the effect of unconscionably compromising the administration of justice.
That cannot be permitted. An accused is entitled to a fair trial. A conviction
resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept of justice. The use
of evidence collected in breach of the safeguards provided by Section 50 at the
trial, would render the trial unfair.
(5)
That whether or not the safeguards provided in Section 50 have been
duly observed would have to be determined by the court on the basis of the
evidence led at the trial. Finding on that issue, one way or the other, would
be relevant for recording an order of conviction or acquittal. Without giving
an opportunity to the prosecution to establish, at the trial, that the
provisions of Section 50
and, particularly, the safeguards provided therein were duly complied with, it
would not be permissible to cut short a criminal trial.
(6)
That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated in Section 50 for the
benefit of the person intended to be searched, we do not express any opinion
whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory, but hold that
failure to inform the person concerned of his right as emanating from
sub-section (1) of Section 50,
may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction and
sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law.
(7)
That an illicit article seized from the person of an accused during search
conducted in violation of the safeguards provided in Section 50 of the Act
cannot be used as evidence of proof of unlawful possession of the contraband on
the accused though any other material recovered during that search may be
relied upon by the prosecution, in other proceedings, against an accused,
notwithstanding the recovery of that material during an illegal search.
(8)
A presumption under Section 54 of the Act can only be raised after the prosecution has
established that the accused was found to be in possession of the contraband in
a search conducted in accordance with the mandate of Section 50. An illegal
search cannot entitle the prosecution to raise a presumption under Section 54 of the Act.
(9)
That the judgment in Pooran Mal case [(1974) 1 SCC 345] cannot be
understood to have laid down that an illicit article seized during a search of
a person, on prior information, conducted in violation of the provisions of
Section 50
of the Act, can by itself be used as evidence of unlawful possession of the
illicit article on the person from whom the contraband has been seized during
the illegal search.
(10)
That the judgment in Ali Mustaffa case [(1994) 6 SCC 569]
correctly interprets and distinguishes the judgment in Pooran Mal case
[(1974) 1 SCC 345] and the broad observations made in Pirthi
Chand case[(1996) 2 SCC 37] and Jasbir Singh case [(1996)1 SCC
288] are not in tune with the correct exposition of law as laid down in
Pooran Mal case[(1974) 1 SCC 345]."
Subsequently, another Constitution
Bench of this Court in Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat,
[(2011) 1 SCC 609] had an occasion to consider the case from the
stand-point whether the person who is about to be searched ought to be informed
of his right that he could be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or
a Magistrate. While considering said question, this Court also dealt with the
judgment rendered in Baldev Singh's case and the discussion in paragraphs 24
and 29 was as under:
24.
Although the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case [(1999) 6 SCC 172]
did not decide in absolute terms the question whether or not Section 50 of the NDPS
Act was directory or mandatory yet it was held that provisions of sub-section
(1) of Section 50
make it imperative for the empowered officer to "inform" the person
concerned (suspect) about the existence of his right that if he so requires, he
shall be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate; failure to
"inform" the suspect about the existence of his said right would cause
prejudice to him, and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before
a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, may not vitiate the trial but would render
the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and
sentence of an accused, where the conviction has been recorded only on the
basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from the person
during a search conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS
Act. The Court also noted that it was not necessary that the information
required to be given under Section 50 should be in a prescribed form or in
writing but it was mandatory that the suspect was made aware of the existence
of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate, if so
required by him. We respectfully concur with these conclusions. Any other
interpretation of the provision would make the valuable right conferred on the
suspect illusory and a farce.
...
... ...
29.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the object
with which the right under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act, by way of a safeguard,
has been conferred on the suspect viz. to check the misuse of power, to avoid
harm to innocent persons and to minimise the allegations of planting or
foisting of false cases by the law enforcement agencies, it would be imperative
on the part of the empowered officer to apprise the person intended to be searched
of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate. We have
no hesitation in holding that insofar as the obligation of the authorised
officer under subsection (1) of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is concerned, it is
mandatory and requires strict compliance. Failure to comply with the provision
would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the
conviction if the same is recorded only on the basis of the recovery of the
illicit article from the person of the accused during such search. Thereafter,
the suspect may or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under
the said provision." (Underlying by us)
14. The law is thus well settled that
an illicit article seized from the person during personal search conducted in
violation of the safe-guards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot by itself be used as
admissible evidence of proof of unlawful possession of contra-band.
But the question is, if there be any
other material or article recovered during the investigation, would the
infraction with respect to personal search also affect the qualitative value of
the other material circumstance.
15. At this stage we may also consider
following observations from the decision of this Court in Ajmer Singh v.
State of Haryana [(2010) 3 SCC 746] :-
"15.
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the provision of Section 50 of the Act
would also apply, while searching the bag, briefcase, etc. carried by the
person and its non-compliance would be fatal to the proceedings initiated under
the Act. We find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel. It requires
to be noticed that the question of compliance or non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS
Act is relevant only where search of a person is involved and the said section
is not applicable nor attracted where no search of a person is involved. Search
and recovery from a bag, briefcase, container, etc. does not come within the
ambit of Section 50
of the NDPS Act, because firstly, Section 50 expressly speaks of search of person only.
Secondly, the section speaks of taking of the person to be searched by the
gazetted officer or a Magistrate for the purpose of search. Thirdly, this issue
in our considered opinion is no more res integra in view of the observations
made by this Court in Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [(2003) 7 SCC 465].
The Court has observed: (SCC p. 471, para 16)
"16.
A bare reading of Section 50
shows that it only applies in case of personal search of a person. It does not
extend to search of a vehicle or a container or a bag or premises (see Kalema
Tumba v. State of Maharashtra[(1999) 8 SCC 257], State of Punjab
v. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172] and Gurbax Singh v. State of
Haryana [(2001) 3 SCC 28]). The language of Section 50 is
implicitly clear that the search has to be in relation to a person as
contrasted to search of premises, vehicles or articles. This position was
settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case. Above
being the position, the contention regarding non-compliance with Section 50 of the Act
is also without any substance."
16. As regards applicability of the
requirements under Section 50
of the Act are concerned, it is well settled that the mandate of Section 50 of the Act
is confined to "personal search" and not to search of a vehicle or a
container or premises.
17. The conclusion (3) as recorded by
the Constitution Bench in Para 57 of its judgment in Baldev Singh clearly
states that the conviction may not be based "only" on the basis of
possession of an illicit article recovered from personal search in violation of
the requirements under Section 50 of the Act but if there be other evidence
on record, such material can certainly be looked into.
In the instant case, the personal
search of the accused did not result in recovery of any contraband. Even if
there was any such recovery, the same could not be relied upon for want of
compliance of the requirements of Section 50 of the Act. But the search of the vehicle
and recovery of contraband pursuant thereto having stood proved, merely because
there was non-compliance of Section 50 of the Act as far as "personal
search" was concerned, no benefit can be extended so as to invalidate the
effect of recovery from the search of the vehicle. Any such idea would be
directly in the teeth of conclusion (3) as aforesaid.
18. The decision of this Court in
Dilip's case, however, has not adverted to the distinction as discussed
hereinabove and proceeded to confer advantage upon the accused even in respect
of recovery from the vehicle, on the ground that the requirements of Section 50 relating to
personal search were not complied with. In our view, the decision of this Court
in said judgment in Dilip's case is not correct and is opposed to the law laid
down by this Court in Baldev Singh and other judgments.
19. Since in the present matter, seven
bags of poppy husk each weighing 34 kgs. were found from the vehicle which was
being driven by accused- Baljinder Singh with the other accused accompanying
him, their presence and possession of the contraband material stood completely
established.
20. In the circumstances, the acquittal
recorded by the High Court, in our considered view, was not correct. We,
therefore, set aside the view taken by the High Court.
While allowing this appeal, we restore
the order of conviction recorded by the Trial Court and hold accused Baljinder
Singh and Khushi Khan to be guilty of the offence punishable under Section 50 of the Act.
We, however, reduce their substantive sentence from 12 years to 10 years while
maintaining other incidents of sentence namely, the payment of fine and the
default sentence unaltered.
The appeals stand allowed in aforesaid
terms.
21. Both the accused are given time
till 15th November, 2019 to surrender before the concerned police station to
undergo remaining sentence. In case, the accused fail to surrender within said
period, they shall immediately be taken into custody by the concerned Police
Station. A copy of this judgment shall be communicated to the concerned Chief
Judicial Magistrate and Police Station for compliance. The compliance in that behalf
shall be reported to this Court on or before 01.12.2019.
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