Supreme Court Clarifies Fixed-Term Life Imprisonment: A Deep Dive into Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of NCT of Delhi

In a landmark ruling that reshapes our understanding of life imprisonment sentences in India, the Supreme Court recently addressed a pivotal question: What happens when a convict completes a fixed-term life sentence without remission? The case of Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others (Criminal Appeal No. 3271 of 2025, arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 17915/2024) provides crucial insights into sentencing, remission, and the right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Decided on July 29, 2025, by a bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan, this judgment not only resolves the appellant's plea but also sets a precedent for prison authorities nationwide. This  post incorporates the full details from the Supreme Court's judgment, including its detailed reasoning on life imprisonment, remission distinctions, and directives for implementation. Let's break it down step by step.

The Background: A High-Profile Crime and Its Aftermath

This case stems from the infamous Nitish Katara murder, a 2002 incident that shocked the nation. Sukhdev Yadav, also known as Pehalwan, was convicted alongside co-accused Vikas Yadav and Vishal Yadav for offenses under Sections 302 (murder), 364 (kidnapping), and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) read with Section 34 (common intention) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The FIR (No. 192/2002) was registered at P.S. Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad, based on a complaint by Smt. Nilam Katara, the mother of the deceased victim.

• Trial Court Conviction: In 2011, the Sessions Court (SC No. 76/2008) sentenced Yadav to life imprisonment with fines, all sentences to run concurrently. Specifically, he received life imprisonment and a Rs. 10,000 fine under Section 302 IPC (with two years' rigorous imprisonment in default), seven years' rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 5,000 fine under Section 364 IPC (six months in default), and three years' rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 5,000 fine under Section 201 IPC (six months in default).

• High Court Enhancement: On appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 145/2012), the Delhi High Court in 2015 modified the sentence, specifying "life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission" along with a fine of Rs. 10,000. The High Court also handled related appeals and a revision petition from the State and complainant seeking enhancement to death penalty. Sentences under Sections 302/34 and 364/34 were to run concurrently, while Section 201/34 was initially consecutive but later modified. Fines were directed to the Delhi Legal Services Authority for victim compensation, and notice to Nilam Katara was mandated for any parole or remission applications.

• Supreme Court Modification: In 2016 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1528-1530/2015), this Court upheld the conviction and sentence but modified it to make the Section 201/34 sentence concurrent.

• The Trigger for Appeal: Yadav sought furlough in 2023 under Rule 1223 of the Delhi Prison Rules, 2018, which was denied by prison authorities on April 28, 2023, citing risks of absconding, disturbance to law and order, and harm to the victim's family. The Delhi High Court dismissed his writ petition (W.P. (Crl.) No. 1682/2023) on November 25, 2024, due to apprehensions about threats to the complainant and witnesses. Yadav appealed to the Supreme Court, but during proceedings, he completed his 20-year term on March 9, 2025. Interim furlough for three months was granted by this Court on June 25, 2025, pending final resolution.

The core issue evolved beyond furlough: Does completing the fixed 20-year term entitle automatic release, or must the convict seek remission for the "life" component? The Court issued notices and even contemplated contempt proceedings against the Principal Secretary (Home) for delays in considering remission, but ultimately focused on the substantive sentencing question.

Key Legal Question: Life Imprisonment vs. Fixed-Term Sentence

The Supreme Court delved into the nuances of "life imprisonment" under the IPC. Section 53 lists it as a punishment, and Section 57 equates it to 20 years for fractional calculations, but precedents clarify it means imprisonment for the convict's natural life unless modified. The judgment emphasized that courts can impose fixed-term life sentences (e.g., 20, 30, or more years) as an alternative to death, especially in "rarest of rare" scenarios. These terms are "actual imprisonment without remission," meaning no early release under Section 433-A CrPC.

In Yadav's case, the sentence was explicitly "life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission." The Court interpreted this as a determinate sentence: Once 20 years are served (excluding parole or furlough periods), release is mandatory, provided no other cases are pending. The Court distinguished this from indeterminate life sentences, where remission might apply post-14 years.

Drawing from landmark cases like Gopal Vinayak Godse (1961), Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008), Union of India vs. V. Sriharan (2016), Shiva Kumar (2023), Navas alias Mulanavas (2024), and others, the bench affirmed courts' power to fix terms beyond 14 years without remission, exercisable only by High Courts or the Supreme Court.

Court's Findings: Release on Completion, Not Remission

The judgment dismantles the State's argument that Yadav must apply for remission post-20 years, treating it as a full-life sentence. Key findings include:

• Distinction from Remission: Remission reduces an ongoing sentence (e.g., for good conduct under prison rules) but doesn't apply here. The fixed term overrides general remission rights, and upon completion, no further application is needed. Remission is for indeterminate life sentences, not fixed ones like this. The Court clarified concepts like pardon, reprieve, respite, commutation, parole, and furlough, noting remission shortens execution without altering conviction (Sarat Chandra Rabha, 1961; Prem Raj, 2003).

• Article 21 Safeguard: Continued detention beyond the sentence term violates the right to life and liberty. The Court noted Yadav's incarceration past March 9, 2025, was illegal, referencing Bhola Kumar (2022) and emphasizing that over-detention breaches constitutional protections. No person shall be deprived of liberty except by procedure established by law.

• No Executive Override: The Sentence Review Board cannot "sit in judgment" over a judicially fixed sentence. High Courts and the Supreme Court alone can impose such modified punishments, as affirmed in V. Sriharan and Shiva Kumar. The Court reiterated the reformative approach (Mohd. Giasuddin, 1977) while balancing victimology (Maru Ram, 1981; Machhi Singh, 1983).

• Broader Implications: The Court directed circulation of the order to all Home Secretaries and Legal Services Authorities to identify and release over-detained convicts nationwide, emphasizing reformative justice while protecting victims. In cases of fixed-term life sentences, release is automatic upon completion, without further remission applications, if not wanted in other cases.

The appeal was disposed of, confirming Yadav's release (he was on interim furlough) without requiring surrender, as he completed his sentence on March 9, 2025.

Why This Matters for Legal Practitioners and Society

This ruling bridges a critical gap in criminal jurisprudence, ensuring fixed-term life sentences aren't diluted into indefinite detention. For lawyers in Punjab, Haryana, or elsewhere handling similar cases, it underscores the need to scrutinize sentencing language—words like "actual imprisonment without remission" signal a finite endpoint. The judgment reinforces proportionality, victim rights, and judicial supremacy over executive discretion.

From a societal lens, it balances retribution with rehabilitation, echoing Justice Krishna Iyer's views in Mohd. Giasuddin on reforming offenders without offending communal conscience. Yet, it doesn't ignore victims: The Court previously ensured notice to them in remission pleas. The directive for nationwide implementation highlights systemic issues in over-detention, promoting Article 21 compliance.

As we navigate evolving criminal laws, this judgment reminds us that justice must be precise, proportionate, and humane. If you're drafting petitions or analyzing precedents, keep this case handy—it's a masterclass in sentencing dynamics.

 

Key Case Laws Cited in the Supreme Court Judgment: Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of NCT of Delhi

The Supreme Court judgment in Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others (Criminal Appeal No. 3271 of 2025, decided on July 29, 2025) extensively references prior precedents to interpret the meaning of "life imprisonment," fixed-term sentences, remission, and related constitutional principles. These citations form the backbone of the Court's reasoning on whether a convict completing a fixed-term life sentence (e.g., 20 years without remission) is entitled to automatic release or must seek further remission. Below, I describe the cited case laws in the order they appear in the judgment, providing a brief overview of each case's facts, key holdings, and their relevance to this ruling. This structured summary highlights how the Court used these precedents to affirm that fixed-term life sentences end upon completion, without requiring additional remission applications.

Core Precedents on the Meaning of "Life Imprisonment"

These cases establish that life imprisonment generally means imprisonment for the convict's natural life, unless modified, and provide the foundation for fixed-term variations.

• Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1961 SC 600): A Constitution Bench held that a sentence of life imprisonment means imprisonment for the convict's entire remaining natural life, unless commuted or remitted by appropriate authorities. The Court in the present case relied on this to clarify that life sentences are not automatically equivalent to a fixed term like 20 years, but can be modified judicially.

• Ashok Kumar alias Golu vs. Union of India (AIR 1991 SC 1792): This ruling interpreted "imprisonment for life" under Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as meaning the full span of the convict's life. It was cited to emphasize that life sentences are indeterminate unless specified otherwise.

• Saibanna vs. State of Karnataka ((2005) 4 SCC 165): The Court observed that life imprisonment means imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's life, unless commuted or remitted, and cannot be equated to a fixed term. Referenced here to distinguish between life sentences and determinate sentences.

• Swamy Shraddananda (2) vs. State of Karnataka ((2008) 13 SCC 767): A three-Judge Bench substituted a death sentence with life imprisonment without remission for the convict's natural life, creating a "special category" of sentence beyond standard remission (e.g., after 14 years). This precedent was pivotal in the judgment, affirming courts' power to impose fixed-term life sentences (e.g., 20+ years) as alternatives to death, putting them beyond executive remission.

• Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab ((2013) 3 SCC 294): It was ruled that life imprisonment means the convict's whole natural life and cannot be limited to 14, 20, or 30 years. Cited to reinforce that fixed terms must be explicitly judicially imposed.

• Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra ((2013) 13 SCC 1): The Court held life imprisonment as rigorous imprisonment for the convict's natural life, not equivalent to fixed terms like 14 or 20 years. Used to support the interpretation of life sentences as lifelong unless modified.

Precedents on Fixed-Term Sentences and Judicial Power

These cases discuss courts' authority to impose modified life sentences exceeding 14 years without remission.

• Union of India vs. V. Sriharan ((2016) 7 SCC 1): A Constitution Bench affirmed that courts can impose life imprisonment for a fixed term (e.g., 20-40 years) without remission as an alternative to death, overriding executive remission powers. This was central to the judgment, endorsing that such sentences are binding and do not require further remission applications upon completion.

• Navas alias Mulanavas vs. State of Kerala (2024 SCC OnLine SC 315): The Court modified a 30-year fixed-term life sentence to 25 years without remission, considering factors like the crime's gravity and reformation potential. Cited to illustrate proportionality in fixing terms and the irrelevance of remission post-completion.

• Shiva Kumar vs. State of Karnataka ((2023) 9 SCC 817): Reaffirmed courts' power to impose fixed-term life sentences (e.g., 30 years) even without a death penalty context. The judgment used this to confirm that fixed terms apply broadly, not just in commutation from death.

• Sangeet vs. State of Haryana ((2013) 2 SCC 452): This case questioned depriving remission for fixed terms beyond 14 years, but it was overruled in Sriharan. Referenced to highlight its inconsistency with established law.

• Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal ((2001) 4 SCC 458), Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan ((2001) 6 SCC 296), Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) vs. State of Maharashtra ((2002) 2 SCC 35), Ram Anup Singh vs. State of Bihar ((2002) 6 SCC 686), Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India ((2005) 7 SCC 417), Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao vs. State of Maharashtra ((2001) 10 SCC 109), and Nazir Khan vs. State of Delhi ((2003) 8 SCC 461): These seven cases collectively involved modifying death sentences to life imprisonment with directives for no release before serving 20+ years or for life. Cited in the context of Swamy Shraddananda to support judicial overrides on remission.

Precedents on Remission, Pardon, and Related Concepts

These clarify remission as a reduction in sentence execution, distinct from fixed-term completion.

• Maru Ram vs. Union of India ((1981) 1 SCC 107): A Constitution Bench upheld Section 433-A of the CrPC, mandating at least 14 years' imprisonment before remission for life sentences. Emphasized here that remission applies to indeterminate life sentences, not fixed terms, and does not entitle automatic release.

• State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Prem Raj ((2003) 7 SCC 121): Distinguished pardon, reprieve, respite, remission, and commutation under Articles 72/161. Used to explain that remission reduces sentence duration without altering conviction, irrelevant for completed fixed terms.

• Sarat Chandra Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath (AIR 1961 SC 334): Held that remission affects only sentence execution, not the conviction. Cited to differentiate remission from acquittal.

• State of Haryana vs. Mahender Singh ((2007) 13 SCC 606) and State of Mysore vs. H. Srinivasmurthy ((1976) 1 SCC 817): These affirm a legal right to be considered for remission under prison rules, but not as a constitutional entitlement. Referenced to note that policy-based remission cannot override judicial fixed terms.

• Satish vs. State of U.P. ((2021) 14 SCC 580): Directed premature release after 20 years, balancing gravity with reformation. Cited to stress that sentence length alone does not bar release, but fixed terms must be served fully.

• Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan ((1987) 3 SCC 347) and State of Haryana vs. Mohinder Singh ((2000) 3 SCC 394): Distinguished parole/furlough from remission; parole is temporary and does not count toward remission. Used to clarify that fixed terms exclude such benefits during the specified period.

• Mohd. Giasuddin vs. State of A.P. ((1977) 3 SCC 287): Advocated a reformative approach to punishment. Referenced for societal balance in sentencing.

• Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab ((1983) 3 SCC 470) and Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab ((1980) 2 SCC 684): Established the "rarest of rare" doctrine for death penalties. Cited in Swamy Shraddananda context for proportionality in substituting death with fixed-term life.

• Bhola Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2022 SCC OnLine SC 837): Ruled that detention beyond sentence completion violates Article 21. Directly applied to declare the appellant's post-20-year detention illegal.

• Gopal Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand ((2013) 7 SCC 545): Justified fixed-term sentences based on crime parameters. Referenced to affirm the High Court's 20-year term.

This judgment synthesizes these precedents to conclude that fixed-term life sentences, like the 20-year term here, mandate release upon completion without further remission, protecting Article 21 rights.

 

Relevant Paragraphs from the Supreme Court Judgment: Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of NCT of Delhi

The Supreme Court judgment in Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others (Criminal Appeal No. 3271 of 2025, decided on July 29, 2025) extensively discusses the legal principles surrounding "life imprisonment," fixed-term sentences, remission, and related concepts under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Below, I reproduce the key paragraphs from the judgment (as extracted from the provided attachment) where these legal aspects are analyzed. These are presented in sequence for context, with paragraph numbers referenced from the original text. The discussion focuses on the interpretation of life imprisonment under Sections 53 and 57 of the IPC, judicial power to impose fixed-term sentences, distinctions from remission, and constitutional safeguards under Article 21.

Discussion on the Meaning of "Life Imprisonment" (Paragraphs 8-8.3)

"8. In light of the aforesaid rival contentions, it is necessary to delineate on the distinction between remission of sentence and release on completion of a sentence of an accused-convict in the case of a life sentence. But before that, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the phrase “life imprisonment”.

8.1 Section 53 of the IPC speaks about various punishments which could be ordered against the offenders and imprisonment for life is one of such punishment. The said Section reads as under:
“53. Punishments.- The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code are –
First. – Death;
Secondly. – Imprisonment for life;
***[Clause “Thirdly” omitted by Act 17 of 1949, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 6.4.1949].
Fourthly. – Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely :-
(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
(2) Simple;
Fifthly. – Forfeiture of property;
Sixthly. – Fine.”
Section 57 of the IPC is also relevant and is extracted as under:
“57. Fractions of terms of punishment.– In calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.”

8.2 The expression life imprisonment has been considered in various decisions of this Court which could be adverted to at this stage. In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 600 (“Gopal Vinayak Godse”), it was observed that a sentence of imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural life. In Ashok Kumar alias Golu vs. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1792, it was observed that the expression “imprisonment for life” must be read in the context of Section 45, IPC. Then, it would ordinarily mean imprisonment for the full or complete span of life. In Saibanna vs. State of Karnataka, (2005) 4 SCC 165, it was observed that life imprisonment means to serve imprisonment for the remainder of his life unless sentence is commuted or remitted. It cannot be equated with any fixed term. In Swamy Shraddananda (2) vs. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 (“Swamy Shraddananda (2)”), it was observed that it is conclusively settled by a catena of decisions that the punishment of imprisonment for life handed down by the Court means a sentence of imprisonment for the convict for the rest of his life. However, further discussion of this case is made later. In Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC 294, it was observed that life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or twenty years or even thirty years, rather it always means the whole natural life. In Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1, it was observed that imprisonment for life is to be treated as rigorous imprisonment for life. It was also observed that life imprisonment cannot be considered as equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or twenty years or even thirty years, rather it always means the whole natural life.

8.3 However, in a catena of cases, the punishment of imprisonment for life has been restricted to certain number of years, for instance twenty years or thirty years or thirty-five years. In such a situation, would it mean, on completion of the fixed term of imprisonment, say twenty years as in the instant case, that the accused-convict would have to continue to remain in jail for the remainder of his life or become entitled to be released from jail on completion of the term of twenty years?"

Discussion on Judicial Power to Impose Fixed-Term Sentences (Paragraphs 9-9.8, Summarizing Swamy Shraddananda (2))

"9. In Swamy Shraddananda (2), a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the question as to how would the sentence of imprisonment for life works out in actuality. This Court pondered over the definition of the word “life” in Section 45 of the IPC which has been defined to denote the life of the human being, unless the contrary appears from the context. Further, whether this Court, which commutes the punishment of death awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court as life imprisonment, would mean literally for life or in any case, for a period far in excess of fourteen years. It was observed that this Court in its judgment may make its intent explicit and state clearly that the sentence handed over to the convict is imprisonment till his last breath or, life permitting, imprisonment for a term not less than twenty, twenty-five or even thirty years. But once the judgment is pronounced, the execution of the sentence passes into the hands of the executive and is governed by the different provisions of law. This Court questioned as to how the sentence of imprisonment for life (till its full natural span) given to a convict as a substitute for the death sentence be viewed differently and segregated from the ordinary life imprisonment given as the sentence of first choice.

9.1 The appellant in the said case, on conviction, was imposed the death sentence, which was confirmed by the High Court. A two-Judge Bench of this Court concurred on the conviction of the appellant but was unable to agree on the punishment to be meted out to him. Sinha, J. felt that in the facts and circumstances of the case the punishment of life imprisonment, rather than death would serve the ends of justice. However, he opined, the appellant would not be released from prison till the end of his life. Katju, J. on the other hand, was of the view that the appellant therein deserves nothing but death penalty. Hence, the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench.

9.2 Aftab Alam, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench, after discussing the manner in which the crime was committed referred to the judgments in Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470 (“Machhi Singh”) and Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (“Bachan Singh”). It was observed that in Bachan Singh, the principle of “the rarest of rare” cases was laid down and in Machhi Singh, this Court for practical application, crystallised the principle into five definite categories of cases of murder and in doing so also considerably enlarged the scope for imposing death penalty. It was also observed that in reality in the later decisions neither “the rarest of rare cases” principle nor the Machhi Singh categories were followed uniformly and consistently. Holding that this Court was reluctant to confirm the death sentence of the appellant therein, the question about the punishment being commensurate to the appellant’s crime was considered. Not accepting the fact that life imprisonment could be equated to a term of fourteen years, it was observed that “the answer lies in breaking this standardisation that, in practice, renders the sentence of life imprisonment equal to imprisonment for a period of no more than fourteen years: in making it clear that the sentence of life imprisonment when awarded as a substitute for death penalty would be carried out strictly as directed by the Court.” This Court, therefore, thought it fit to lay down a good and sound legal basis for imposing the punishment of imprisonment for life, when awarded as substitute for death penalty, beyond any remission so that it may be followed in appropriate cases as a uniform policy not only by this Court but also by the High Courts, being the superior courts in their respective States.

9.3 Referring to Sinha, J. order, that a life sentence was meant to be “life sentence”, reference was also made to the judgments of this Court in Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 458; Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296; Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 35; Ram Anup Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 686; Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 417 (“Mohd. Munna”); Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 109; and Nazir Khan vs. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461.

9.4 In the aforesaid seven decisions, this Court modified the death sentence to imprisonment for life or in some case imprisonment for a term of twenty years with a further direction that the convict must not be released from prison for the rest of his life or before actually serving the term of twenty years, as the case may be, primarily on two premises: one, an imprisonment for life, in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC meant imprisonment for the rest of life of the prisoner and two, a convict undergoing life imprisonment has no right to claim remission. In support of the second premise, reliance was placed on the line of decisions beginning from Gopal Vinayak Godse and upto Mohd. Munna.

9.5 In Swamy Shraddananda (2), this Court took note of the contention that to say that a convict undergoing a sentence of imprisonment has no right to claim remission was not the same as the Court, while imposing the punishment of imprisonment, suspending the operation of the statutory provisions of remission and restraining the appropriate Government from discharging its statutory function. It was contended in the said case that just as the Court could not direct the appropriate Government for granting remission to a convicted prisoner, it was not open to the Court to direct the appropriate Government not to consider the case of a convict for grant of remission in sentence. It was contended therein that giving punishment for an offence is a judicial function but the execution of the punishment passes into the hands of the executive and under the scheme of statute, the Court had no control over the execution. This contention was however, not accepted and held to be untenable. Referring to Sections 45, 53, 54, 55 and 57 of the IPC, it was observed that Section 57 provides that in calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years. That Section 57 of the IPC does not in any way limit the punishment for imprisonment for life to a term of twenty years. It only provides that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as imprisonment for twenty years while calculating fraction of terms of punishment. It was observed that the object and purpose of Section 57 would be clear by referring to Sections 65, 116, 119, 129 and 511 of the IPC.

9.6 Discussing on remission, it was pointed out that under the Prison Acts and the Rules for good conduct and for doing certain duties, etc. inside the jail, the prisoners are given some days’ remission on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. The days of remission so earned by a prisoner are added to the period of his actual imprisonment (including the period undergone as an undertrial) to make up the term of sentence awarded by the Court.

9.7 Taking note of the way in which remission is actually allowed in cases of life imprisonment, it was found necessary to make a special category for the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and to put that category beyond the application of remission. This Court further observed that if the Court’s option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence of life imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more than fourteen years and the other death, the Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty which would be disastrous in certain cases.

9.8 Consequently, the three-Judge Bench agreed with the view taken by Sinha, J. and substituted the death sentence given to the appellant therein by imprisonment for life and directed that he shall not be released from prison till the rest of his life."

Discussion on Constitution Bench Affirmation in Sriharan (Paragraphs 10-10.10)

"10. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 (“Sriharan”) considered, inter alia, the following two questions:
“(i) As to whether the imprisonment for life means till the end of convict's life with or without any scope for remission?
(ii) Whether a special category of sentence instead of death for a term exceeding 14 years can be made by putting that category beyond grant of remission?”

10.1 The Constitution Bench speaking through Kalifulla, J.- for the majority- observed that the first question relates to Sections 53 and 45 of the IPC vis-à-vis the meaning of “life imprisonment” as to whether it means imprisonment for the rest of one’s life or a convict has a right to claim remission. The second question is based on the ruling of Swamy Shraddananda (2).

10.2 Having noted the judgments of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse and Maru Ram as well as other cases discussed therein which have followed those decisions, it was observed that, “The first part of the first question can be conveniently answered to the effect that imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal Code only means imprisonment for rest of the life of the prisoner subject, however, to the right to claim remission, etc. as provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution to be exercisable by the President and the Governor of the State and also as provided under Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code.”

10.3 On the concept of remission in paragraph 62, it was observed as under:
“62……Similarly, in the case of a life imprisonment, meaning thereby the entirety of one's life, unless there is a commutation of such sentence for any specific period, there would be no scope to count the earned remission. In either case, it will again depend upon an answer to the second part of the first question based on the principles laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2).”

10.4 With regard to the second part of the first question which pertains to the special category of the sentence to be considered in substitute of death penalty by imposing a life sentence i.e., the entirety of the life or a term of imprisonment which can be less than full life term but more than fourteen years and put that category beyond application of remission which has been propounded in paragraphs 91 and 92 of Swamy Shraddananda (2), it was observed that the said dictum “has come to stay as on this date”.

10.5 Analysing the decision in Swamy Shraddananda (2) and endorsing the same, it was observed that the death penalty in that case was set aside although much anguish was expressed on the nature of the crime and the life sentence for the rest of the life of the convict therein was ordered by this Court. The justification for the same was stated in paragraph 68 of Sriharan in the following words:
“68. … But in an organised society where the Rule of Law prevails, for every conduct of a human being, right or wrong, there is a well-set methodology followed based on time tested, well-thought out principles of law either to reward or punish anyone, which were crystallised from time immemorial by taking into account very many factors, such as the person concerned, his or her past conduct, the background in which one was brought up, the educational and knowledge base, the surroundings in which one was brought up, the societal background, the wherewithal, the circumstances that prevailed at the time when any act was committed or carried out whether there was any pre-plan prevalent, whether it was an individual action or personal action or happened at the instance of anybody else or such action happened to occur unknowingly, so on so forth. It is for this reason, we find that the criminal law jurisprudence was developed by setting forth very many ingredients while describing the various crimes, and by providing different kinds of punishment and even relating to such punishment different degrees, in order to ensure that the crimes alleged are befitting the nature and extent of commission of such crimes and the punishments to be imposed meets with the requirement or the gravity of the crime committed.”

10.6 After referring in detail to the judgment of this Court in Swamy Shraddananda (2), it was observed that when by way of a judicial decision, after a detailed analysis, having regard to the proportionality of the crime committed, it is decided that the offender deserves to be punished with the sentence of life imprisonment i.e. till end of his life or for a specific period of twenty years, thirty years or forty years, such a conclusion should survive without any interruption. In such an event, it can be stated that such punishment imposed will have no remission or other such liberal approach should not come into effect to nullify such imposition. Accepting the submission of learned Solicitor General that there is no restriction to fix any period beyond fourteen years and up to the end of one’s life span, it was stated that the Court can sentence the accused to undergo imprisonment for a specified period even beyond fourteen years without any scope for remission. The Court can direct that such offender is not to be released early and be kept in confinement for a longer period by imposition of an appropriate sentence.

10.7 Moving further it was observed that nowhere under the IPC is there any prohibition that the imprisonment cannot be imposed for any specific period within the lifespan. Thus, when life imprisonment is imposed, the Court can specify the period up to which the said sentence of life should remain, befitting the nature of crime committed, when the Court’s conscience does not persuade the death penalty. Therefore, the dictum in Swamy Shraddananda (2) was approved by this Court by observing that within the prescribed limit of life imprisonment, imprisonment for a specified period would be a proportionate punishment having regard to the nature of the crime as well as the interest of the victim.

10.8 Therefore, the law-makers have thought it fit to prescribe the minimum and maximum sentence to be imposed having regard to the nature of crime and have left it to the Courts to determine the kind of punishments that have to be imposed within the prescribed limit under the relevant provision. In other words, while the maximum extent of punishment of either death or life imprisonment is provided for under the relevant provisions, it will be for the Courts to decide if, in its opinion, the imposition of death may not be warranted, what should be the number of years of imprisonment that would be judiciously and judicially more appropriate. This is by taking into account, apart from the crime itself, the interest of the society at large and other relevant factors which cannot be put in any straight jacket formula. The said process of determination must be held to be available with the courts by virtue of extent of the punishments provided for such specified nature of crimes and such power is also to be derived from those penal provisions themselves.

10.9 Further, it was noted that even with regard to the nature of punishment imposed by the Sessions Court insofar as capital punishment is concerned, the reference made to the Division Bench of the High Court is in order to give a second look to the findings arrived by the Sessions Court, both with regard to conviction as well as with regard to the death penalty imposed. In a death reference case, the High Court can commute the death penalty to life imprisonment or for any specific period of more than fourteen years i.e. twenty, thirty or so on, depending upon the gravity of the crime committed and the exercise of judicial conscience vis-à-vis the offences proved to have been committed.

10.10 In conclusion, it was observed as under:
“105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court.”"

Discussion on Remission and Related Concepts (Paragraphs 14-14.7)

"14. The expression “remission” has been considered in a number of judgments which we can discuss. This is as opposed to the expression “parole and furlough” etc. With reference to the decisions of this Court and on a discussion of the expression “remission”, it becomes clear that the said expression is used in two nuances: firstly, when the remission of sentence would mean a reduction in the sentence imposed on a convict without wiping out of the conviction which does not amount to an acquittal. On the other hand, remissions are also granted during the course of undergoing a sentence on the basis of the certain legal considerations. The same can be discussed in detail.

14.1 The principles covering grant of remission as distinguished from concepts such as “commutation”, “pardon”, and “reprieve” can be brought out with reference to a judgment of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 (“Prem Raj”). Articles 72 and 161 deal with clemency powers of the President of India and the Governor of a State respectively, and also include the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentences in certain cases. The power under Article 72, inter alia, extends to all cases where the punishment or sentence is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends and in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death. Article 161 states that the Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. It was observed in the said judgment that the powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India are absolute and cannot be fettered by any statutory provision, such as, Sections 432, 433 or 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”) or by any prison rules.

14.1.1 It was further observed in Prem Raj that a pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It affects both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender. But pardon has to be distinguished from “amnesty” which is defined as a “general pardon of political prisoners; an act of oblivion”. An amnesty would result in the release of the convict but does not affect disqualification incurred, if any. “Reprieve” means a stay of execution of a sentence, a postponement of a capital sentence. “Respite” means awarding a lesser sentence instead of the penalty prescribed in view of the fact that the accused has had no previous conviction. It is tantamount to a release on probation for good conduct under Section 360 of the CrPC. On the other hand, remission is reduction of a sentence without changing its character. In the case of a remission, neither the guilt of the offender is affected nor is the sentence of the court, except in the sense that the person concerned does not suffer incarceration for the entire period of the sentence, but is relieved from serving out a part of it. Commutation is change of a sentence to a lighter sentence of a different kind. Section 432 of the CrPC empowers the appropriate Government to suspend or remit sentences.

14.2 Further, a remission of sentence does not mean acquittal and an aggrieved party still has every right to vindicate himself or herself. In this context, reliance could be placed on Sarat Chandra Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334, wherein a Constitution Bench of this Court, while distinguishing between a pardon and a remission, observed that an order of remission does not wipe out the offence and it also does not wipe out the conviction. All that it does is to have an effect on the execution of the sentence; though ordinarily a convicted person would have to serve out the full sentence imposed by a court, he need not do so with respect to that part of the sentence which has been ordered to be remitted. An order of remission, thus, does not in any way interfere with the order of the court; it affects only the execution of the sentence passed by the court and frees the convicted person from his liability to undergo the full term of imprisonment inflicted by the court even though the order of conviction and sentence passed by the court still stands as it is. The power to grant remission is an executive power and cannot have the effect which the order of an appellate or revisional court would have of reducing the sentence passed by the trial court and substituting in its place the reduced sentence adjudged by the appellate or revisional court. According to Weater's Constitutional Law, to cut short a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise of executive power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment but does not alter it qua the judgment.

14.3 Reliance could be placed on State of Haryana vs. Mahender Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606, to observe that a right to be considered for remission, keeping in view the constitutional safeguards of a convict under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India, must be held to be a legal one. Such a legal right emanates from not only the Prisons Act, 1894 but also from the Rules framed thereunder. Although no convict can be said to have any constitutional right for obtaining remission in his sentence (except under Articles 72 and 161), the policy decision itself must be held to have conferred a right to be considered therefor. Whether by reason of a statutory rule or otherwise, if a policy decision has been laid down, the persons who come within the purview thereof are entitled to be treated equally - vide State of Mysore vs. H. Srinivasmurthy, (1976) 1 SCC 817.

14.4 Satish vs. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580 can be pressed into service to hold that the length of the sentence or the gravity of the original crime cannot be the sole basis for refusing premature release. Any assessment regarding a predilection to commit crime upon release must be based on antecedents as well as conduct of the prisoner while in jail, and not merely on his age or apprehensions of the victims and witnesses. It was observed that although a convict cannot claim remission as a matter of right, once a law has been made by the appropriate legislature, it is not open for the executive authorities to surreptitiously subvert its mandate. It was further observed that where the authorities are found to have failed to discharge their statutory obligations despite judicial directions, it would then not be inappropriate for a Constitutional Court while exercising its powers of judicial review to assume such task onto itself and direct compliance through a writ of mandamus. Considering that the petitioners therein had served nearly two decades of incarceration and had thus suffered the consequences of their actions, a balance between individual and societal welfare was struck by granting the petitioners therein conditional premature release, subject to their continuing good conduct. In the said case, a direction was issued to the State Government to release the prisoners therein on probation in terms of Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938 within a period of two weeks. Liberty was reserved to the respondent State with the overriding condition that the said direction could be reversed or recalled in favour of any party or as per the petitioner therein.

14.5 The following judgments of this Court are apposite to the concept of remission:

14.5.1 In Maru Ram, a Constitution Bench considered the validity of Section 433-A of the CrPC. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Bench, observed: (SCC p. 129, para 25)
“25. … Ordinarily, where a sentence is for a definite term, the calculus of remissions may benefit the prisoner to instant release at the point where the subtraction results in zero.”

14.5.2 However, when it comes to life imprisonment, where the sentence is indeterminate and of an uncertain duration, the result of subtraction from an uncertain quantity is still an uncertain quantity and release of the prisoner cannot follow except on some fiction of quantification of a sentence of uncertain duration.

14.5.3 Referring to Gopal Vinayak Godse, it was observed that the said judgment is an authority for the proposition that a sentence of imprisonment for life is one of “imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life”, unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by an appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of law. In the aforesaid case, a distinction was drawn between remission in sentence and life sentence. Remission, limited in time, helps computation but does not ipso jure operate as release of the prisoner. But, when the sentence awarded by the Judge is for a fixed term, the effect of remissions may be to scale down the term to be endured and reduce it to nil, while leaving the factum and quantum of sentence intact. However, when the sentence is a life sentence, remissions, quantified in time, cannot reach a point of zero. Since Section 433-A deals only with life sentences, remissions cannot entitle a prisoner to release. It was further observed that remission, in the case of life imprisonment, ripens into a reduction of sentence of the entire balance only when a final release order is made. If this is not done, the prisoner will continue to be in custody. The reason is that life sentence is nothing less than lifelong imprisonment and remission vests no right to release when the sentence is of life imprisonment nor is any vested right to remission cancelled by compulsory fourteen years jail life as a life sentence is a sentence for whole life.

14.5.4 Interpreting Section 433-A, it was observed that it was a savings clause in which there are three components. Firstly, CrPC generally governs matters covered by it. Secondly, if a special or local law exists covering the same area, the latter law will be saved and will prevail, such as short sentencing measures and remission schemes promulgated by various States. The third component is that if there is a specific provision to the contrary, then it would override the special or local law. It was held that Section 433-A of the CrPC picks out of a mass of imprisonment cases, a specific class of life imprisonment cases and subjects it explicitly to a particularised treatment. Therefore, Section 433-A of the CrPC applies in preference to any special or local law. This is because, Section 5 of the CrPC expressly declares that specific provision, if any, to the contrary will prevail over any special or local law. Therefore, Section 433-A of the CrPC would prevail and escape exclusion of Section 5 thereof. The Constitution Bench concluded that Section 433-A of the CrPC is supreme over the remission rules and short-sentencing statutes made by various States. Section 433-A of the CrPC does not permit parole or other related release within a span of fourteen years.

14.5.5 It was further observed that criminology must include victimology as a major component of its concerns. When a murder or other grievous offence is committed, the victims or other aggrieved persons must receive reparation and social responsibility of the criminal to restore the loss or heal the injury is part of the punitive exercise although the length of the prison term is no reparation to the crippled or bereaved.

14.5.6 Fazal Ali, J. in his concurring judgment in Maru Ram observed that crime is rightly described as an act of warfare against the community touching new depths of lawlessness. According to him, the object of imposing a deterrent sentence is threefold. While holding that a deterrent form of punishment may not be the most suitable or ideal form of punishment, yet, the fact remains that a deterrent punishment prevents occurrence of offence. He further observed that Section 433-A of the CrPC is actually a piece of social legislation which by one stroke seeks to prevent dangerous criminals from repeating offences and on the other hand, protects the society from harm and distress caused to innocent persons. Therefore, he opined that where Section 433-A applies, no question of reduction of sentence arises at all unless the President of India or the Governor of a State choose to exercise their wide powers under Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution respectively, which also have to be exercised according to sound legal principles as any reduction or modification in the deterrent punishment would, far from reforming the criminal, be counterproductive.

14.6 State of Haryana vs. Mohinder Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 394 is a case which arose under Section 432 of the CrPC on remission of sentence in which the difference between the terms “bail”, “furlough” and “parole” having different connotations were discussed. It was observed that furloughs are variously known as temporary leaves, home visits or temporary community release and are usually granted when a convict is suddenly faced with a severe family crisis such as death or grave illness in the immediate family and often the convict/inmate is accompanied by an officer as part of the terms of temporary release of special leave. Parole is the release of a prisoner temporarily for a special purpose or completely before the expiry of the sentence, on promise of good behaviour. Conditional release from imprisonment is to entitle a convict to serve remainder of his term outside the confines of an institution on his satisfactorily complying all terms and conditions provided in the parole order.

14.7 In Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347, it was observed that parole is a provisional release from confinement but it is deemed to be part of imprisonment. Release on parole is a wing of reformative process and is expected to provide opportunity to the prisoner to transform himself into a useful citizen. Parole is thus, a grant of partial liberty or lessening of restrictions on a convict prisoner but release on parole does not change the status of the prisoner. When a prisoner is undergoing sentence and confined in jail or is on parole or furlough, his position is not similar to a convict who is on bail. This is because a convict on bail is not entitled to the benefit of the remission system. In other words, a prisoner is not eligible for remission of sentence during the period he is on bail or when his sentence is temporarily suspended. Therefore, such a prisoner who is on bail is not entitled to get remission earned during the period he is on bail."

Discussion on Application to the Case and Article 21 (Paragraphs 15-15.7)

"15. The sentence imposed on the appellant herein, inter alia, is recapitulated as under:
“Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission, and fine of Rs.10,000/-.”
The word “which” used after the words “life imprisonment”, is an interrogative pronoun, related pronoun and determiner, referring to something previously mentioned when introducing a clause giving further information. Therefore, the sentence of life imprisonment is determined as twenty years which is of actual imprisonment. Further, during the period of twenty years, the appellant cannot seek remission during his sentence of twenty years of imprisonment i.e., after completion of fourteen years as per Section 433A of the CrPC but must continue his sentence for a period of twenty years without any remission whatsoever. Therefore, the appellant has no right to make any application for remission of the above sentence for a period of twenty years.

15.1 In Criminal Appeal Nos.1531-1533 of 2015 filed by Vikas Yadav as well as in Criminal Appeal Nos.1528-1530 of 2015 which also included the appeal filed by the appellant herein, the imposition of a fixed term sentence on the appellants by the High Court was also questioned but this Court observed that such a term of sentence on the appellants by the High Court could not be found fault with. Placing reliance on Gopal Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545, at paragraph 84 of its judgment in the aforesaid criminal appeal, this Court observed that “Judged on the aforesaid parameters, we reiterate that the imposition of fixed terms sentence is justified.”

15.2 In the instant case, as already noted, the life imprisonment being twenty years of actual imprisonment was without consideration of remission. Soon after the period of twenty years is completed, in our view, the appellant has to be simply released from jail provided the other sentences run concurrently. The appellant is not under an obligation to make an application seeking remission of his sentence on completion of twenty years. This is simply for the reason that the appellant has completed his twenty years of actual imprisonment and in fact, during the period of twenty years, the appellant was not entitled to any remission. Thus, in the instant case, on completion of the twenty years of actual imprisonment, it is wholly unnecessary for the appellant to seek remission of his sentence on the premise that his sentence is a life imprisonment i.e. till the end of his natural life. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State and respondent-complainant contended that once the period of twenty years is over, which was without any consideration of remission, the appellant had to seek remission of his sentence (life imprisonment) by making an application to the Sentence Review Board which would consider in accordance with the applicable policy and decide whether the remission of sentence imposed on the appellant has to be granted or not. Such a contention cannot be accepted for the following reasons:
(i) firstly, because, in the instant case, the sentence of life imprisonment has been fixed to be twenty years of actual imprisonment which the appellant herein has completed;
(ii) secondly, during the period of twenty years the appellant was not entitled to seek any remission; and
(iii) thirdly, on completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment, the appellant is entitled to be released.

15.3 This is because in this case, instead of granting death penalty, alternative penalty of life imprisonment has been awarded which shall be for a period of twenty years of actual imprisonment. That even in the absence of death penalty being imposed, life imprisonment of a fixed term of twenty years was imposed which is possible only for a High Court or this Court to do so. The period of twenty years is without remission inasmuch as the appellant is denied the right of remission of his sentence on completion of fourteen years as per Section 432 read with Section 433-A of the CrPC. Such a right has been denied by the High Court but that does not mean that on completion of twenty years of imprisonment the appellant has to still seek reduction of his sentence on the premise that he was awarded life imprisonment which is till the end of his natural life. If that was so, the High Court would have specified it in those terms. On the other hand, the High Court has imposed life imprisonment which shall be twenty years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission. The High Court was of the view that for a period of twenty years, the appellant has to undergo actual imprisonment which would not take within its meaning any period granted for parole or furlough.

15.4 In the instant case, the actual imprisonment of twenty years was admittedly completed by the appellant on 09.03.2025 which was without any remission. If that is so, it would imply that the appellant has completed his period of sentence. In fact, the award of the aforesaid sentence was also confirmed by this Court. On completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment on 09.03.2025, the appellant was entitled to be released. The release of the appellant from jail does not depend upon further consideration as to whether he has to be released or not and as to whether remission has to be granted to him or not by the Sentence Review Board. In fact, the Sentence Review Board cannot sit in judgment over what has been judicially determined as the sentence by the High Court which has been affirmed by this Court. There cannot be any further incarceration of the appellant herein from 09.03.2025 onwards. On the other hand, in the instant case, the appellant’s prayer for furlough was refused by the High Court and, thereafter, this Court granted furlough only on 25.06.2025 as he had completed his actual sentence by then, pending consideration of the amended prayer made by the appellant herein on completion of his sentence on 09.03.2025. Therefore, the continuous incarceration of the appellant from 09.03.2025 onwards was illegal.

15.5 In Bhola Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 837, this Court lamented the unfortunate fate of prisoners languishing behind bars even long after completing their period of sentence noted as follows:
“23. …When such a convict is detained beyond the actual release date it would be imprisonment or detention sans sanction of law and would thus, violate not only Article 19(d) but also Article 21 of the Constitution of India. …”

15.6 Although, presently the appellant is not in custody but on furlough for three months pursuant to the interim order dated 25.06.2025 passed by this Court, he need not surrender after expiry of the period of furlough as he has completed his jail sentence of twenty years on 09.03.2025, if not wanted in any other case.

15.7 Consequently, we hold that in all cases where an accused/convict has completed his period of jail term, he shall be entitled to be released forthwith and not continued in imprisonment if not wanted in any other case. We say so in light of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."